The Polio Vaccine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Why the Controversies? by Pham, Thuy D. & Martinez, Annette P.
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 
Volume 11 
Issue 2 Spring 2008 Article 4 
October 2015 
The Polio Vaccine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Why the 
Controversies? 
Thuy D. Pham 
Annette P. Martinez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl 
Recommended Citation 
Thuy D. Pham & Annette P. Martinez, The Polio Vaccine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Why the 
Controversies?, 11 DePaul J. Health Care L. 125 (2008) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol11/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
THE POLIO VACCINE AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS:
WHY THE CONTROVERSIES?
Thuy D. Pham* & Annette P. Martinez**
I. INTRODUCTION
Controversy is a fact of life. The diverse nationalities, religions, and
opinions in America foster a sense of pride in freedom of speech and in
controversial views in areas as far-reaching as viruses in vaccines and
the law. However, when these controversies adversely affect the lives
of ordinary citizens, an imperative need to peel away the layers of
controversies arises in order to arrive at a fundamental truth, so that a
more protective system could be created for providing relief to injured
individuals.
Regarding the polio vaccine, two major controversies have
surrounded its use since it was developed. The first-"Vaccine
Associated Paralytic Poliomyelitis" (VAPP) 1-is well recognized.
Members of the scientific medical profession and national and
international health institutions have accepted it as an inevitable public
health problem.
Although known since the 1960s, the second controversy-the
subject of this essay-has not been adequately addressed. The
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scientific community has kept it quiet, confined within its walls and
hidden from public discussions and scrutiny.
In 1960, Bernice Eddy, an American government researcher,
discovered that when she injected hamsters with the monkey kidney
mixture on which the polio vaccine was "bred," the hamsters developed
tumors.2 Alarm spread throughout the scientific community because
scientists realized that the polio vaccine, which was cultured in monkey
kidney cells, was contaminated with a monkey virus called Simian
Virus 40, or "SV40." 3
Immediately, the scientific community performed studies on it;
and, health officials decided that the virus did not cause cancer in
humans. Thereafter, the apprehension regarding the carcinogenic
effects of SV40 in humans faded.
However, in the mid-1990s, a brilliant scientist came forth to
rock the stability of the scientific community. Using the most modem
molecular techniques, Dr. Michele Carbone and his colleagues detected
SV40 DNA in human tumors extracted from patients with
mesotheliomas, which are tumors of the lung pleura. Since Dr. Eddy's
1960 study, this was the first time scientists were awakened to the fact
that human beings who were administered the polio vaccine
contaminated with the monkey virus, SV40, may be developing
cancers.
4
Today, this concern becomes more frightening by the fact that
an increasing number of independent laboratories in the United States,
Europe, and Asia likewise reported the detection of SV40, not just in
human mesotheliomas, but also in various human tumors such as bone
tumors (osteosarcomas), and brain tumors (e.g. medullablastomas,
choroid plexus papillomas).5
However, a number of laboratories argued that they were unable
to detect SV40 in mesothelioma tumors, that positive findings of SV40
in various tumors may be due to laboratory contamination, and that it
was doubtful that SV40 plays a role in causing cancer. 6 Thus, a
controversial scientific debate emerged, as to whether or not SV40
plays a role in causing human cancer.
Although there is no solid scientific agreement on SV40, the
issue of its cancer-producing effects has reached the courts, with
I 2-See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
3 "40" because it was the fortieth Simian virus discovered.
4 The term "cancer" refers to any malignant tumor.
5 See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs beginning to sue SV40-contaminated polio vaccine
manufacturers for negligence.
7
In an article entitled Drug Designs are Different,8 the American
Law Institute (ALI) and the Reporters of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)," which include James
A. Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski, argue that the Restatement
(Third) permits courts to determine the defectiveness of a drug or
vaccine design. The courts evaluate the drug or vaccine, which is
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and is already
in the market, but does not allow a plaintiff to claim that a safer drug or
vaccine could have been developed and marketed by the manufacturer. 9
Henderson and Twerksi state that the Restatement (Third)'s refusal to
consider unapproved alternatives in assessing the defendant's drug
design "does not rest on judicial deference to FDA expertise."' 10 Rather,
the Reporters' question whether courts have "the institutional
competence" to determine if a safer, alternative drug or vaccine could
have been approved by the FDA and marketed at the time in order to
have prevented the plaintiffs injuries.I1
On the other end of the scale, George Conk, 12 along with other
critics, 13 argued that the Restatement (Third)'s creates a pro-defendant
approach that limits the liability of drug manufacturers for drug design
defect. Conk argued that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
absence of a reasonable alternative design standard for prescription
drugs allowed distributors of blood to escape liability for supplying
blood products contaminated with the Hepatitis C virus and the HIV
7 See Horwin v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., No. CVOO-04523-WJR (C.D.Cal. 2003).
8 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111




12 See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The Continuing Search for Proper Perspective:
Whose Reasonableness Should Be at Issue in a Prescription Product Design Defect
Analysis?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 233 (1999); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription
Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REv. 1357, 1378-85
(1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, Prescription Products]; Teresa Moran Schwartz,
Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance Between the
Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 459 (1997); Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a
Roof Before the Foundation Is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 270 (1997);
Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement
(Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 207 (1999).
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virus. 14 Conk expresses concern that the Restatement (Third) rule
would tolerate and perpetuate such hazards in the future. 15
Additionally, Conk and critics argued that the Reporters and the
Restatement (Third) rely too heavily on FDA expertise.1 6
These controversies traverse diverse fields: law, medicine,
science, economics, government organization, and politics. Yet, when
such fields build a system of collaboration, interdependence, and
reliance, a vacuum is created that endangers the people. This is when
the system needs to be penetrated in order to protect human life.
Part I of this essay presents a background on polio vaccination,
along with the scientific account of the controversial SV40 story. Part
II analyzes whether manufacturers of SV40-contaminated vaccines
could be held liable based on the Restatement (Third)'s three standards
of product defects, namely: design, manufacturing, and warning
defects. Part III discusses the role of the Food and Drug
Administration and how other government health agencies network for
information in the SV40 contamination controversy. It also shows the
weakness in the FDA process that may spell the difference between
safety and risk, specifically in the area of vaccines. Part IV uncovers
the role of the scientists in the SV40 controversy and exposes the
impact of scientific misconduct on government health agencies'
decisions, which in turn affect the public. Part V illustrates the
dynamics of a powerful "system of triangulation" at work. With a
system of interdependence and reliance among manufacturers, the
FDA-government and the scientists, the SV40 controversy remains
hidden from public scrutiny. Part VI suggests that a powerful system
of triangulation can be overcome by tort litigation, as exemplified by
the experience in tobacco litigation.
14 George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000).
" Id. at 1088-90.
16 See id. at 1089 (discussing how Restatement (Third) is silent on blood products
and thus incorporates the statutory ban on strict liability claims for blood products).
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II. THE HISTORY OF SV40 AND THE ORAL POLIO
VACCINE
A. Polio and Polio Vaccination
Polio, or poliovirus, is a highly ubiquitous and contagious
disease, which is caused by a virus. 17 When the poliovirus invades the
nervous system, infection can cause permanent total or partial paralysis
and, in some cases, death. Polio mainly affects children under five
years of age. However, it can strike anybody and could infect nearly
every person in a given population. Also, unlike other diseases, such as
measles from which most children either recover or die, society is
reminded everyday of the devastating crippling effects of this disease.
There is no medication to cure polio; however, it can be prevented by
vaccination. Today, the polio vaccine is the most powerful weapon
against the disease.
Two vaccines were developed in the 1950s in order to control
polio. First, Dr. Jonas Salk developed the killed-poliovirus vaccine,
which was done through inactivation of poliovirus by formalin. This
was licensed as inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV), 18 and must be
injected into the recipient three times. Second, Dr. Albert Sabin
developed the live attenuated poliovirus vaccine or oral poliovirus
vaccine, also known as OPV. 19
OPV has been scientifically proven to curtail epidemics and
greatly reduce the incidence of polio worldwide.20 The most significant
example of its effectiveness is the success of the "Global Polio
17 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND
PREVENTION OF VACCINE-PREVENTABLE DISEASES 97-110, (W. Atkinson et. al. eds.,
9th ed. 2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/publications/pink/polio.pdf
(providing a simple explanation of polio).
18 See, e.g., FREDERICK ROBBINS, The History of Polio Vaccine Development, in
VACCINES, 13 (Stanley A. Plotkin & Walter Orenstein eds., Saunders Co. 3d ed.
1999) [collection of essays hereinafter VACCINES 3rd ed.].
19 See, e.g., GARY EBBERT ET AL., Overview of Vaccine Manufacturing and Quality
Assurance, in VACCINES 3rd ed. supra note 18, at 40.
20 See, e.g., D.L. Heymann et al., Oral Poliovirus Vaccine in Tropical Africa: Greater
Impact on Incidence of Paralytic Disease than Expected from Coverage Surveys and
Seroconversion Rates, 65 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 495 (1987); M.P. Chumakov
et al., Some Results of the Work on Mass Immunization in the Soviet Union with Live
Poliovirus Vaccine Prepared from Sabin Strains, 25 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 79
(1961).
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Eradication Initiative, ' 21 which was spearheaded by the World Health
Organization (WHO), Rotary International, U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), the UNICEF, and other partners. In
1994, the entire Western Hemisphere, including the United States, was
certified free of poliovirus by an International Certification
Commission convened by the Pan American Health Organization.22
Due to massive vaccination campaigns, rarely has a serious disease
been controlled as rapidly and as dramatically as has polio in the
United States and the rest of the world.
23
B. Two Problems with the Polio Vaccine
But, two problems exist with the polio vaccine. The first
problem is related to an adverse event known as "Vaccine Associated
Paralytic Poliomyelitis" or VAPP. The public is aware of the VAPP
adverse event, the subject of most polio litigation cases today.24 The
second problem-SV40 contamination- has been hidden from public
awareness. A clear distinction needs to be made between the two
problems because the scientific basis of their difference is crucial in the
evaluation of concepts in products liability law.
1. Vaccine-Associated Paralytic Poliomyelitis (VAPP)
In rare events, oral polio vaccine (OPV) administration has
been associated with paralysis in healthy recipients and their contacts.
21 See generally, World Health Org. Press Releases, Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, http://www.polioeradication.org/pressreleases.asp (last visited Jan. 28,
2007). The WHO website lists press releases on the success of its polio eradication
initiative. Id.
22 See generally Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Certification of
Poliomyelitis Eradication - the Americas, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.,
Oct. 7, 1994, at 720, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview/mmwrhtml/00032760.htm.
23 World Health Org., European Region - Three Years Polio-Free, POLIO
NEWS ERADICATION, Feb. 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.polioeradication.org/content/polionews/polionews 14.pdf; see also
ROLAND SUTTER ET AL., Live Attenuated Poliovirus Vaccines, in VACCINES 3rd ed.
supra note 18 at 384.
24 See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Perez v.
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999); Fay Spence, Alternatives to
Manufacturer Liability for Injuries Caused by the Sabin-type Oral Polio Vaccine, 28
WM & MARY L. REv. 711, 712 (1987) (citing Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d
1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1974)).
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OPV causes the VAPP adverse event in an estimated one case in 2.4
million doses administered.25 This happens because the live attenuated
poliovirus in the vaccine may revert back to virulence in the human
host, and therefore, produce full blown effects of the actual polio
disease with the potential for epidemic spread.26 Scientists, physicians,
and public health officials agree that the VAPP adverse event is
specifically unavoidable. 27 IPV, the inactivated killed-poliovirus
vaccine which is administered by injection is does not cause VAPP.
Dr. Stanley Plotkin, a world renowned expert in the field of
vaccination, summarizes the consensus of the medical-scientific
community with regard to the VAPP event: "VAPP is an inescapable
scientific phenomenon that has been consistently observed after OPV
administration." 28 In other words, the VAPP adverse event is a
problem that is scientifically unavoidable. It occurs even though the
vaccine is properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and
warnings.
American public policy addressed this problem through the
enactment of the National Child Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.30 Under
this Act, a "no-fault" compensation program (known as the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program) was established in which
awards can be made quickly and efficiently to individuals injured by
25 Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Poliomyelitis Prevention in the
United States: Introduction of a Sequential Vaccination Schedule of Inactivated
Poliovirus Vaccine Followed by Oral Poliovirus Vaccine, Recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 46 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., RECOMMENDATIONS & REPS. 3:2, Jan. 24, 1997, at 2, 6,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/PDF/rr/rr4603.pdf, see also PAUL
PARKMAN & CAROLYN HARDEGREE, Regulation and Testing of Vaccines, in
Vaccines 3rd ed. supra note 18, at 1142.
26 See e.g. Kew OM, Sutter RW, et. al., Vaccine-derived Polioviruses and the
Endgame Strategy for Global Polio Eradication; 59 ANN. REV. MICROBIOLOGY 2005
587; see also, Kew 0, Morris-Glasgow V. et. al., Outbreak of Poliomyelitis in
Hispaniola Associated with Circulating Type 1 Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus; 12
SCIENCE 356 (2002) (explaining that for instance, an outbreak of paralytic
poliomyelitis occurred in the Dominican Republic (13 confirmed cases) and Haiti (8
confirmed cases)). The polio outbreak was associated oral polio live vaccine itself.
27 See generally STANLEY PLOTKIN ET AL., Inactivated Polio Vaccine, in
VACCINES 3rd ed., supra note 18.
28 Id. at 359.
29 See Randall B. Keiser, Djb Vu All Over Again? The National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 19 fn 36 (1992)
(discussing the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986, which
acknowledges there are some injuries that are associated with the Polio Vaccine).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006).
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adverse events of childhood vaccines. Victims of VAPP can claim
monetary compensation for their injury; rules and other legal
procedures are relaxed to accelerate the compensation process. 31
2. SV40 Viral Contamination
In June of 1955, a report appeared in the University of
Michigan Medical Bulletin by John Enders, a Harvard virologist who
won the Nobel prize for his work in developing the polio vaccine.
Enders suggested that the technique for producing the polio vaccine
was "not entirely satisfactory. 3 2 The defective technique raised the
"risk of including other agents whose presence may or may not be
recognized., 33 These contaminating "agents" to which Enders referred
to, was isolated in 1957, when Dr. Maurice Hilleman joined Merck
laboratories. Dr. Hilleman, together with Dr. Sweet, reported the
isolation of the virus that caused vacuolation 34 in monkey cells and
named it SV40. 35
But there was more to SV40. In 1960, Bernice Eddy, a United
States government researcher, discovered that when she injected
hamsters with the monkey kidney mixture on which the vaccine was
bred, the hamsters developed tumors.36 Dr. Hillman recalls, "At first
it was just a finding of one more virus, just another damn thing we had
to screen for....Then we started to develop tumors in hamsters. My
31 Id.; see also EDMUND KITCH ET AL., U.S. Law, in VACCINES 3rd ed., supra
note 18, at 1175. Compensation is given to a vaccine recipient whose injury correlates
with the vaccine injury listed in the Vaccine Injury Table of the Act and whose injury
occurred within the specified time periods. Id. at 1174-1175.
32 Pat Wechsler, A Shot in the Dark, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 11, 1996, at 40; see also
T.J. Moriarty, The Polio Vaccine and Simian Virus 40, Chronic Ill Net - Online News,
http://www.chronicillnet.org/ online/bensweet.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
33 Wechsler, supra note 32. Even as Enders published his warning, scientists in the
United States and Britain were conducting experiments with these "viral
contaminating agents." Id.
34 A term used in the science of histology to describe the formation of vesicles
within the cytoplasm of the cell.
35 B.H. Sweet & MR. Hilleman, The Vacoulating Virus, SV40, 105 PROC. SOC'Y FOR
EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY & MED. 420 (1960).
36 Bernice E. Eddy et al., Tumors Induced in Hamsters by Injection of Rhesus
Monkey Kidney Cell Extracts, 107 PROC. SOC'Y FOR EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY & MED.
191, 192-93 (1961); A.J. Girardi et al., Development of Tumors in Hamsters
Inoculated in the Neonatal Period with Vacuolating Virus, SV40, 109 PROC. SOC'Y
FOR EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY & MED. 649, 660 (1962). For a comprehensive
summary of the SV40 science controversy, see Debbie Bookchin & Jim Schumacher,
The Virus and the Vaccine, ATL. MONTHLY, Feb. 2000, at 68-80.
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God, this was a great revelation., 37 Other scientists isolated the virus
as well, but the government did not take action until much later.
38
Meanwhile, as early as the 1960s, vaccine batches of both the
OPV and the IPV were tested and found to be contaminated with
SV40. 39 The gravity of this finding becomes evident considering that
from 1955 through early 1963, approximately 98 million people
worldwide were unknowingly exposed to the SV40 virus through
contaminated polio vaccines.40 The public was not told. "I don't think
anybody along the way was irresponsible," Dr. Hilleman says.41 "It
was important not to convey to the public [this] information, because
you could start a panic. They had already had production problems with
people getting polio. If you added to that the fact they found live
[monkey] virus in the vaccine, there would have been hysteria..., 42
Alarm spread throughout the scientific community.
Immediately, a series of studies were done 4 3 and health officials
decided that-thankfully the virus did not cause tumors in humans.44
Thereafter, for the next thirty years or so, the controversy of
polio vaccines being contaminated with possible cancer-producing
SV40 remained at a lull.
45
Then, in 1994, Dr. Michele Carbone, a prominent Italian
physician-researcher at Loyola University Medical Center, revived the
issue of SV40 contamination in polio vaccines. Dr. Carbone had just
completed a series of experiments in which he had injected the monkey
virus SV40 into dozens of hamsters. Every single one of them formed
37 Wechsler, supra note 32, at 1-2.
38 Wechsler, supra note 32, at 1-3.
39 Id.; see also Robbins, supra note 18, at 17; P. Gerber et al., Inactivation of
Vacuolating Virus (SV40) by Formaldehyde, 108 PROC. SOC'Y FOR EXPERIMENTAL
BIOLOGY & MED. 205 (1961) (explaining that SV40's inactivation curve with
formaldehyde was such that some active virus might survive an exposure that was
fully sufficient to inactivate the poliovirus).
40 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Immunization Program
(NIP), Concerns about Vaccine Contamination, Simian Virus 40 (SV40), Polio
Vaccine and Cancer, http://www.cdc.gov/nip/ vacsafe/concerns/cancer (last visited
Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter CDC-NIP Concerns]; see also Michele Carbone et al.,
Simian Virus 40, Poliovaccines and Human Tumors: A Review of Recent
Developments, 15 ONCOGENE 1877 (1997); Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36,
at 68.
41 Wechsler, supra note 32, at 1.
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., J.F. Fraumeni et al., An Evaluation of the Carcinogenicity of
Simian Virus 40 in Man, 185 JAMA 713 (1963).
44 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 68.
45 Id. at 68-69.
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a rare form of malignant lung cancer called mesothelioma4 6 and died
within three to six months.47
Dr. Carbone then teamed up with Dr. Harvey Pass, then chief of
thoracic surgery at the National Cancer Institute in Bethesda, for further
48experimentation. Dr. Harvey Pass had carefully saved tumor tissues
from the mesothelioma surgeries he had performed and now had one of
the largest collections of mesothelioma biopsies in the world.49  Dr.
Carbone, Dr. Pass, and another colleague, Antonio Procopio used a
new molecular technique called the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)
to look for SV40 DNA in Dr. Pass' tumor samples. Results were
published in "Oncogene," one of the world's largest leading cancer
journals, showing 60% of human mesothelioma samples contained
SV40 DNA; non-tumor control samples were negative for SV40
DNA.5
0
Great concern was elicited by the fact that in most of the
positive samples Dr. Carbone has tested, SV40 was actively producing
proteins-suggesting that SV40 was not just an opportunistic
"passenger virus" that had found a comfortable resting place in
malignant tumor cells, but was likely to have been involved in
producing the tumors. 51 This was the first time scientists uncovered
persuasive evidence that the polio vaccine contaminant-SV40-might
cause cancer not just in rodents, but also in human beings.5 2
Other scientists at the National Institutes of Health were not
receptive to Dr. Carbone's work53 They told Dr. Carbone that the last
thing anyone wanted to hear was that the polio vaccine was associated
with cancer. Implying that the vaccine contaminated by SV40 was
linked to cancer, even if the contamination occurred forty years ago,
would easily shake public confidence in vaccination. 54
46 Claudia Cicala et al., SV40 Induces Mesothelioma in Hamsters, 142 AM. J.
PATHOLOGY 1524, 1533 (1993) (reporting that macroscopic, microscopic,
ultramicroscopic, and histochemical techniques have confirmed the presence of virus-
induced mesotheliomas in mammals).
47 See generally, Michele Carbone et al., New Molecular and Epidemiological
Issues in Mesothelioma: Role of SV40, 180 J. OF CELLULAR PHYSIOLOGY 167, 168
(1999).
48 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 68-70.
49 Id. at 69.
50 Id. at 70; Michele Carbone et al., Simian Virus 40-like DNA Sequences in Human
Pleural Mesothelioma, 9 ONCOGENE 1781 (1994).
51 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 75.
52 Id. at 68-75.




Since Dr. Carbone and colleagues published their first study in
1994, more and more scientists from different laboratories in the United
States, Europe and Asia, have confirmed Dr. Carbone's results in
detecting the presence of SV40 in mesotheliomas from human lung
tissue.55 More troubling is the fact that the virus has also been detected
in other kinds of tumors-not just mesotheliomas-but also in bone
tumors (osteosarcomas) 56 and brain tumors (e.g. medullobalstomas,
ependymomas & choroids plexus tumors).57 Virologist Dr. Janet Butel
of Baylor College of Medicine in Texas and her chief collaborator, Dr.
John Lednicky, reported that they had found SV40 in a number of
children's brain tumors.5 8
As of today, the presence of SV40 in different types of human
cancer has been reported by many independent laboratories from all
over the world.59
Yet, other influential and prominent scientists remain skeptical
about the relationship between SV40 contaminated vaccines and
cancer. Dr. Howard Strickler at the Viral Epidemiology Branch of the
National Cancer Institute decided to see whether Carbone's work could
be reproduced by a researcher of the Branch's choosing.6 ° Strickler
55 Id. at 73-74; see also, J.R. Testa et al., A Multi-institutional Study Confirms
the Presence and Expression of Simian Virus 40 in Human Malignant Mesotheliomas,
58 CANCER RES. 4505-09 (1998); Christopher Pepper et al., Simian Virus 40 Large T
Antigen (SV40LTAg) Primer Specific DNA Amplification in Human Pleural
Mesothelioma Tissue, 51 THORAX 1074, 1076 (1996).
56 See, e.g., Michele Carbone et al., SV40-like Sequences in Human Bone
Tumors, 13 ONCOGENE 527 (1996); Michele Carbone et al., supra note 47.
57 See, e.g., Daniel Bergsagel et al., DNA Sequences Similar to Those of Simian
Virus 40 in Ependymomas and Choroid Plexus Tumors of Childhood, 51 NEw ENGL.
J. MED. 988 (1992).
58 John Lednicky et al., Natural Simian Virus 40 Strains Are Present in
Human Choroid Plexus Ependymoma Tumors, 212 VIROLOGY 710 (1995).
59 See, e.g., H.N. Zhen et al., Expression of the Simian Virus 40 Large Tumor
Antigen (Tag) and Formation of Tag-p53 and Tag-pRb Complexes in Human Brain
Tumors, 86 CANCER 2124 (1999); H. Yamamoto et al., High Incidence of SV40-like
sequences Detection in Tumour and Peripheral Blood Cells of Japanese
Osteosarcoma Patients, 82 BRIT. J. CANCER 1677 (2000); R. Vilzez, et al. Association
Between Simian Virus 40 and Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma, 359 LANCET 817 (2002);
BHRAT JASANI and KATIE Ross, Molecular Detection of Simian Virus 40 in Human
Mesothelioma, in MALIGNANT MESOTHELIOMA: ADVANCES IN PATHOGENESIS,
DIAGNOSIS, AND TRANLATIONAL THERAPIES (Harvey Pass, MD; Nicholas Vogelzang,
MD; Michele Carbone, MD, PhD eds., Springer 2005) [hereinafter MALIGNANT
MESOTHELIOMA].
60 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 71; Wechsler, supra note 32, at
2008]
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explained that if Carbone's results could not be duplicated, then further
tests for the presence of SV40 in human tumors would not be
necessary.61
The scientist selected to lead the research effort for the
National Cancer Institute was Dr. Keerti Shah of Johns Hopkins School
of Public Health.62 Earlier in his career, Dr. Shah had done work on
SV40.63
In 1996, Dr. Strickler and Dr. Shah published a paper in the
Journal of Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers and Prevention. 64
Strickler's and Shah's study has greatly influenced the direction of
SV40 research and funding. In contrast to Carbone and other scientists,
Strickler and Shah failed to detect SV40 in their tumor samples, and the
Viral Epidemiology Branch of the National Cancer Institute considered
the case closed.65 Their work is cited again and again by federal health
officials as evidence that the dozens of scientific publications,
including Dr. Carbone's, are not persuasive. 6 6 Because Dr. Strickler
and Dr. Shah are respected prominent scientists, their work has been
highly influential in government response to this controversy.
Nonetheless, science-wise, the issue of whether SV40 causes cancer in
humans is still controversial and is still undergoing vigorous debate.
67
The SV40 controversy has roused the involvement of the legal
profession as well. Lawyer Donald MacLachlan spent almost two
years investigating whether the government and drug manufacturers
could have acted sooner to prevent the spread of SV40 through the
polio vaccine. 68 Together with a colleague, Robert Brownson,
MacLachlan had stumbled upon troubling data of what the government
had been aware of for decades. Tests of stored vaccine - conducted by
the National Cancer Institute in 1963 - showed that nineteen states,
including Pennsylvania, New York, and most of New England,
received heavily contaminated shipments of polio vaccine between
61 Wechsler, supra note 32, at 3.
62 Id.
63 Id; Keerti Shah & Neal Nathanson, Human Exposure to SV40: Review and
Comment, 103 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 12 (1976).
(A H.D. Strickler et al., Simian Virus 40 and Pleural Mesothelioma in Humans,
5 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION. 473 (1996).
65 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 71.
66 Id. at 71-72.
67 CDC-NIP Concerns, supra note 40 (explaining, "SV40 has been found in
certain types of human cancers.., however, some research results are conflicting and
more studies are needed").
68 Wechsler, supra note 32, at 3.
[Vol. 11. 2:125
THE POLIO VACCINE
May and July 1955.69 This meant that close to four million children
were inoculated with polio vaccine containing high levels of SV40.70
Today, government regulations mandate that polio vaccine
manufacturers screen for known viruses including SV40 and guarantee
that the vaccine is free from any adventitious agents.7 ' Medical and
scientific literature emphasize the fact that cell lines currently used for
polio vaccine production come from monkeys raised in colonies free of
72SV40 or from continuous well-characterized cell lines. 7 . The World
Health Organization (WHO), the international agency that provides
regulations that manufacturers must follow to be eligible to sell the
vaccine through the UNICEF, 73 assures the public that all currently-
produced oral polio vaccine is now tested for SV40, and none has been
found positive. 74 Government health agencies like the ,CDC, National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and the FDA assure the public that SV40 is




7' 21 C.F.R. § 610. See also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Cancer,
Simian Virus 40 (SV40), and Polio Vaccine Fact Sheet, explaining, "Polio vaccines
being used today do not contain SV40. All of the current evidence indicates that
polio vaccines have been free of SV40 since 1963" available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/iso/concems/archive/polio and cancer factsheet.htm
(last visited December 16, 2007).
72 See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 18, at 387; Sutter, supra note 23, at 17.
73 WORLD HEALTH ORG., REQUIREMENTS FOR POLIOMYELITIS VACCINE
(ORAL), (REQUIREMENTS FOR BIOLOGICAL SUBSTANCES No. 7, (REVISED 1989))
(1990) available at http://www.basics.org/pdf/
WHOBASICSVaccinesProcurement3_eng.pdf; see also Sutter, supra note 23, -at
377-80 (explaining that around 18 manufacturers worldwide are producing OPV
using the Sabin vaccine seeds, which are now under control of the WHO).
74 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 73; WORLD HEALTH ORG., Supplementary
Information on Vaccine Safety Part 2: Background Rates of Adverse Events
Following Immunization 81 (2000), available at http://www.who.int/vaccines-
documents/DocsPDF00/www562.pdf.
75 CDC-NIP Concerns, supra note 40. Does polio vaccine being given in the
U.S. today contain SV40? No, polio vaccines being used today do not contain SV40.
SV40 was completely removed from the seed strains of the vaccine viruses in the
early 1960's. The polio vaccine currently used in the U.S. (inactivated polio vaccine,
or IPV) . . . has been extensively tested for contaminants, including SV40. ...
Today's testing methods are better. Any live SV40 would be detected by these
methods. Id. See also Sutter, supra note 23, at 387.
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C. Today: Concerns of SV40 Contamination Re-emerge
Today, concerns of SV40 contamination in polio vaccines are
re-emerging. Lawyer Stanley Kops has done intensive research on the
history and manufacturing processes of the oral polio vaccine since it
was first licensed in 1963.76 He expressed the need for a re-
examination of at least one of the three licensed oral polio vaccine
manufacturers.
77
Kops expressed concern that there was conflicting information
on the whether the oral polio vaccine has been free of the viral
contaminant SV40 matter, although scientists and government agencies
restate the fact that after 1963 it was free of any SV40 matter. 78
In an international symposium in January 1997 at which the
NIH, the FDA, and the CDC met in Bethesda, Maryland,
representatives from Lederle, an oral polio vaccine manufacturer, stated
publicly that "all subsequent working seed strains have been prepared
in CMK cells and screened to assure that they are free from SV40
virus. 79 At this meeting, Lederle provided details on the procedures
used for screening, testing, and neutralization of SV40 in the seed
lots.80
However, Kops counters that Lederle's internal documents
failed to show that SV40 was removed from all of the seed lots.
81
According to Kops, a technical superintendent of polio vaccine
production at American Cyanamid stated in a 1979 internal
memoranda: "It should be made clear that Lederle did not test the
original Sabin seeds for extraneous agents or neurovirulence since only
50 ml or less of each seed were provided by Dr. Sabin."
82
76 Stanley P. Kops, Oral Polio Vaccine and Human Cancer: A Reassessment of
SV40 as a Contaminant Based upon Legal Documents, 20 ANTICANCER RES. 4745,
4750 (2000); see also SV40Cancer.com, http://www.sv40cancer.com (last visited Jan.
28, 2007).
77 Kops, supra note 76. Initially, several U.S. corporations produced OPV:
Merck Sharp & Dohme, Wyeth, Pfizer, and Lederle. Id. But as of 1999, only Wyeth-
Lederle Vaccines and Pediatrics produced OPV in the United States). Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at n.16.
80 Id. at n.17.
81 Stanley P. Kops, Oral Polio Vaccine and Human Cancer: A Reassessment of
SV40 as a Contaminant Based upon Legal Documents, 20 ANTICANCER RES. 4745,
4750 (2000) (article on file with author).
82 Id. at n.24.
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Furthermore, Dr. Mary Ritchey testified in a 1998 litigation suit
pertaining to the Lederle oral polio vaccine, that American Cyanamid,
the parent company of Lederle, could not ascertain whether all the
polio vaccine seeds and strains were tested for SV40 contamination
because Lederle did not have protocols in its possession for all of its
seed materials.
8 3
Dr. Ritchey testified that there were no protocols for the three
master seeds (Type I, Type II, and Type III), as well as for any of the
following seed numbers: 3101, 3102, 1102, 45B51, 2107, and 45B52.
Dr. Ritchey also testified that in addition to the master seeds mentioned
above, American Cyanamid utilized intermediate seeds in the
manufacturing process of the oral polio vaccine. Whether these
intermediate seeds were free from SV40 contamination could not be
determined, because there are no records to prove that these seeds were
tested for SV40.84
Kops believes that as scientific knowledge has advanced, the
capability to test for the presence of SV40 with more precision and
accuracy has increased.85 He declares there was no indication that
Lederle incorporated new, modem molecular techniques to screen for
86SV40 contamination in the oral polio vaccines. No independent
scientific investigation has been conducted to determine whether all of
the seeds of the Orimune manufacturer, Lederle, including
intermediated seeds, were free of SV40.8 7
Although government agencies have assured the public that
SV40 is not present in current lots of polio vaccines, 88 there is no
universally accepted scientific publication to date that confirms the
absence of SV40 in polio vaccines, using the most modem molecular
techniques available.
83 Kops, supra note 76, at n.2 1.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 4747.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 CDC-NIP Concerns, supra note 40.
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III. SV40 CONTAMINATION IN THE ORAL POLIO
VACCINES: CAN MANUFACTURERS BE HELD LIABLE
BASED ON THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS?
Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts Products Liability,89 a
commercial seller's liability for harm caused by a defective product
will depend upon the type of product defect involved in each case: (1)
a manufacturing defect, (2) a design defect, or (3) a defect based on
inadequate warnings or instructions.
Liability for selling or distributing a product that contains a
manufacturing defect is strict,90 whereas liability for products which are
defective because of design or inadequate warnings rests upon the test
of reasonableness.
91
A. Prescription Drug Design Defect and the Debate on its
Application
Under the general rule of Section 2(b) of Restatement (Third)
regarding design defect, a product is defective in design when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller,
and the omission of the alternative design renders the product unsafe.
Currently undergoing a heated debate is Section 6(c) of Restatement
(Third), which specifically pertains to prescription drug design defect.
1. Background of the Design-Defect Debate
a. Conk's Critique of the Restatement (Third)'s (Section 6(c))
George Conk 92 criticizes the Restatement (Third) saying "a
design defect lurks in the heart of the Restatement (Third)."93 He
focuses his critique on section 6(c), which is the standard to be utilized
for defective design of prescription drugs and biologics. Conk argues
89 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6 (1997); see also
Rebecca Rutherford, Changes in the Landscape of Products Liability Law: An
Analysis of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 209 (1997).
90 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(a).
91 Id. at § 2(b), (c).
92 Conk, supra note 14, at 1087.
93 Id. at 1087-90.
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that in contrast to the general rule of Section 2(b) of the Restatement
(Third), Section 6(c) has added a unique "super-qualifier" standard of
liability for prescription drugs, biologics, and medical devices, which
exempts sellers of prescription drugs and medical devices from the
alternative-safer-design standard of Section 2(b) applied to all other
products.94
Restatement (Third) Section 6(c) states:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably
safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great
in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients.
Conk argues that Section 6(c) protects a highly favored
industry. He says that in the presence of an alternative design, if the
product causes harm, yet its therapeutic effects are deemed to be
greater in relation to the harm posed by the drug, it will not be
considered defective (net-benefit test).95 According to Conk, to prevail
on a design defect claim, the manufacturer need only persuade the
factfinder that the product does more good than harm for one class of
consumers, so that a reasonable physician would prescribe it. Thus,
even if the product causes significant unnecessary harm, yet benefits
any class of patients or at least one class of patients, it will not be
considered defective.
Conk argues that using this highly protective standard of design
defect, manufacturers of drugs, biologics, and medical devices will not
be held liable even if their products could have been made safe.96 He
worries about the consequences of maintaining a separate, highly
protective liability regime for drug manufacturers as he recounts the
history of the HIV and Hepatitis epidemics among hemophiliacs:
[A] massive epidemic of hepatitis struck hemophiliacs in
the 1970's, transmitted through factor concentrate and other
94 Id.
95 Conk, supra note 14, at 1101-03.
96 Id. at 1107-14.
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blood products.. .Despite the dangers associated with factor
concentrates, physicians concluded that treatment with
these products provided a net benefit to hemophiliacs.
Even when the risk of HIV transmission through blood
became known in the 1980's, reasonable health care
providers continued to prescribe factor concentrate to
hemophiliacs because often there was no alternative. The
imminent threat to life presented by hemophilia-related
emergencies was deemed more compelling than the risk of
contracting a chronic illness from the blood products used
to respond to these emergencies... But in fact, viral
inactivation methods were being researched. In the 1970s,
every factor-concentrate manufacturer, unknown to the
medical community and each in isolation from its
competitors, conducted research into the possibility of
using heat pasteurization to kill viruses in blood products.
However, this process was not implemented by the blood
manufacturers until well after the hepatitis epidemic had
exacted its toll on hemophiliacs. It was only in the early
1980's, as it became clear that AIDS was a blood-borne
disease, that the manufacturers of concentrated blood
products applied for FDA licensing of heat-treatment
processes. Approval was quickly granted, and the
techniques proved to be completely effective in preventing
viral transmission....97
According to Conk's research, "the prevalence of hepatitis
among hemophiliacs had moved blood-products manufacturers to begin
research into viral inactivation methods, but it was only the shock of
the AIDS epidemic that caused them to. . . implement pasteurization
across the board. . . ." Conk argues that if the heat pasteurization
method was implemented earlier, it would have prevented the mass
infection of hemophiliacs with hepatitis and HIV. 98
On the legal front, Conk asserts that during this time period,
the epidemics struck in an environment insulated from
liability concern-the remedy of design-defect review was
essentially foreclosed both by statute and by the common
97 Id. at 1 107-10.
98 Id. at 1110-14.
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law's tacit acceptance of the conventional wisdom that the
dangers presented by blood products and other drugs were
unavoidable. But it was later determined that they were not
unavoidable; rather, there were practical and technically
feasible alternative safer designs for blood products. If the
alternative design test of Section (2) had been applicable to
the blood manufacturers during this period, courts might
reasonably have concluded that an entire industry was
negligent in its failure to develop and adopt alternative
safer designs in a timely manner .... 99
Finally, Conk asserts that the reasonable alternative design
(RAD) standard for other products, usually applicable to
nonprescription products, should also apply to prescription drugs and
medical devices because blood cases in the 1980s would have been
decided differently if blood products had been subjected to the general
RAD rule of the Restatement (Third).' 00
b. Henderson and Twerski's Response
The American Law Institute (ALI) Reporters, namely James A.
Henderson Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, react to Conk's arguments and
those who have criticized the Restatement (Third). 10 1 The Reporters
"identify significant errors in Conk's critique: he has read the
Restatement (Third) incorrectly, and his reliance on the blood cases is
misplaced."' 0 2 They clarify that "drug designs are different from other
product designs,"' 0 3 and thus cannot be subject to the same provisions
of the rule in 2(b). Furthermore, they "question the institutional
competence of courts to decide whether safer drugs could have
received FDA approval and be brought to the market in time to have
helped any given patient."'
10 4
In their article, the Reporters assuage Conk and critics by
clarifying that Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) does not exempt
prescription drug manufacturers for defective design from the
99 Id. at 1112.
100 Conk, supra note 14, at 1118-33.
101 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8.
102 Id. at 153.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 180.
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Reasonable Alternative Design (RAD) standard. 10 5 They assert that
"plaintiffs may establish defectiveness by showing that alternative
drugs were available on the market that reasonable health care
providers would have prescribed in place of a defendant's drug for all
classes of patients."' 0 6 And, yes, the Restatement (Third) does allow
courts to consider already marketed alternatives in assessing a drug
design's defectiveness.
1 07
Because phraseologies and comments for section 6(c) may be
ambiguous, the Reporters admit that they are as "much to blame as
Conk for the confusion" and that they "should have been clearer in the
relevant phraseology."
1 0 8
From a medical/science point of view, this paper will analyze
facets of Section 6(c)'s "constructs" and "phraseologies," which make
drug designs different according to the Reporters. Subsequently, based
on the Reporters' clarifications and interpretations of section 6(c), the
authors will evaluate the Restatement (Third)'s implications on the
issue of SV40-contamination in polio vaccines.
2. Points of Concern from the Viewpoint of the Medical
Profession
a. Health-Care Providers and the Concept of Design
According to the Reporters, the "key" to understanding the
provision of section 6(c), is the reliance on the construct of whether
"reasonable health-care providers" would knowingly "prescribe the
drug or medical device for any class of patients."'
0 9
In an ideal system where information transmission is perfect,
from manufacturer to consumer-via health care providers (also
referred to as the learned intermediary)-all decisions would be
socially optimal because both manufacturers and product users are able
to accurately determine and internalize potential risks." 0 Additionally,
105 Id. at 152.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 155, 162-64.
108 Id. at 155.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Note, Just What You'd Expect: Professor Henderson's Redesign of
Products Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2376, 2383 (1998); Jon Hanson & Kyle D.
Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for
Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 129, 135, 137-38, 160-61 (1990)
[hereinafter Just What You'd Expect] (explaining that, "as long as manufacturers and
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this idealized setting assumes that the physician is in a position of
infallibility, i.e., he is in a better position than a pharmaceutical
manufacturer to make decisions for his patient. Not only is he
informed of all the available drugs and modes of therapy in the market,
but he is also perfectly able to tailor his choice of therapy and
recognize, which risks are remote for a particular patient and which
risks are of very real concern. I1
The Reporters point out that with demanding years of zealous
commitment in education and training, the field of medicine disciplines
physicians with the expertise to assure that the appropriate drugs reach
the appropriate patients. Where some drugs are unreasonably
dangerous to some consumers, yet beneficial to another class of
consumers, the physician is equipped with the knowledge to decide
what is best for their patients. 112 By selectively distributing the drug to
a particular patient, the physician can minimize the limitations of risky
drug design and maximize therapeutic effects tailored to his particular
patient.
Up to a point, the Reporter's argument-that the learned
intermediary will make sure that all the right drugs reach the right
patients-is valid. However, the logic fails when one considers what
has been mentioned time and again in legal literature regarding drug
design: physicians do not make design choices, 113 nor do they oversee
the manufacturer in designing drug formulations.' 14 The role and focus
of a private physician is healing his patient. 115 Conceptualizing drug
design does not emanate from him; instead, he chooses the appropriate
consumers are perfectly informed, the price mechanism ... will generate the optimal
levels of care and activity.").
III See, e.g., Charles Walsh, Steven Rowland & Howard Drofiman, The Learned
Intermediary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L.
REv. 821, 881 (1996).
112 Henderson & Twerski supra note 8, at 156-57.
113 See, e.g., George Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs
and Medical Devices in
a Patent-Constrained Market, 49 UCLA L. REv. 737, 747 (2002) [hereinafter Conk,
The True Test]; Green, supra note 13, at 207, 224.
114 Conk, The True Test, supra note 113, at 747, Green, supra note 13, at 224.
115 Medical training is patient-based. The focus of years of training to obtain an M.D.
is how to treat patients from disease; not how to design drugs in order to treat disease.
See, e.g., Fauci et. al., Introduction to Clinical Medicine, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE (Anthony Fauci et. al., eds. 15th ed. 2001) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE].
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drug therapy from already available drug designs in the market and
then prescribes it to his patient.
Physicians do not have independent expertise regarding the
details of prescription products and do not know nearly as much as
manufacturers the efficacy and safety of drugs.11 6 They may rely on
manufacturers' extensive advertising, promotional programs and
medical sales representatives to learn about the product-sources that
do not provide a complete or accurate picture of product risks. 117
Furthermore, physicians do not always remain up-to-date on available
information-it is not uncommon for doctors to continue to prescribe
familiar forms of medication even if newer alternative drugs released
out in the market are more efficacious and safe. 118 Generally, the role
of the private physician is one of passive reliance on the manufacturer
as the expert.
i. The Manufacturer is Expert
Efforts to develop a new drug or vaccine begin with the
manufacturer who ventures into research and development.11 9 "The
FDA decides what clinical testing and data submissions are necessary
to satisfy the safety and efficacy provisions of the law."'120 In addition
to determining which clinical studies are necessary, the FDA
establishes minimum standards for conducting these studies. 12 1 These
guidelines are outlined through a set of regulations called Good
Clinical Practices (GCPs), 122 which describes the responsibilities of
those who are outlined in a clinical trial: the sponsor (manufacturer),
the investigators, and the Institutional Review Board, whose primary
function is to see that clinical subjects are safe and that they are
adequately informed about the clinical trial. 1
23
116 See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 13.
"' See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY
DECEIVE US AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT, 115-155(Random House Inc. 2005 )
[hereinafter THE TRUTH]; see also, e.g., Teresa Schwartz, The Impact of the New
Products Liability Restatement on Prescription Products, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399,
408-409 nn.75-77 (1995).
118 Id.
119 M. MATHIEU, The New Drug Approval Process: A Primer, in NEW DRUG
DEVELOPMENT: A REGULATORY OVERVIEW 1, 12 (1990); EBBERT ET AL., supra note
19, at 40.
120 EBBERT ET AL., supra note 19, at 40. See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.1-.2.





In the GCP guidelines, the sponsor or manufacturer is
responsible for selecting qualified investigators and providing them
with the data they need in order to properly conduct the
investigation. 124 Although private physicians know general
pharmacologic actions of the drug, its indications, contraindications,
and adverse effects, the concept of drug design is a task that is done by
an inventor-a highly specialized physician or scientist who obtains
further scientific training in areas like molecular biology, molecular
genetics, chemical pharmacology, biochemistry, and others. Such
specialists in medicine/science may be directly employed by a
manufacturer or may be affiliated with academe and collaborate with a
manufacturer for drug design. 125 In addition to selecting qualified
medical/scientists to develop a product, the manufacturer monitors the
investigation, making sure it is conducted in accordance with the
general investigational plan and protocols outlined in the
Investigational New Drug Application (IND). The IND is a proposal
through which the manufacturer obtains the FDA's approval to begin
testing the new product in humans.126 Additionally, the manufacturer
has the responsibility to keep the FDA and investigators informed of
any significant new adverse effect or risk related to the product. 127
With vast economic resources and access to a highly specialized
manpower base, the manufacturer initiates and controls the direction of
research and development of a new drug or vaccine.
Therefore, a realistic examination of liability rules, especially
that which concerns the design of prescription drugs, biologics and
medical devices, should begin with the general observation that the
manufacturer is the expert. He is most informed about his product risks
than are consumers and learned intermediaries.
128
Because the manufacturer is clearly the expert, evaluation of
manufacturer reasonableness in terms of drug or vaccine design should
not be measured by the same standard as that applied to a prescribing
physician. As stated by Conk, stewardship of design is the
responsibility of a manufacturer, and a standard of design-based





128 Just What You'd Expect, supra note 109, at 2376-77.
129 Conk, The True Test, supra note 113, at 749.
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b. The "Net-Benefit Test" via the Assessment of a Learned
Intermediary
The use of the risk-benefit test or net-benefit test 130 to
determine design defect is a complex issue addressed by courts and
products liability scholars.' 3' According to the Reporters, the key to
Section 6(c)'s construct is the learned intermediary who, before
prescribing a drug to his patient, mentally scans all the available drugs
in the market and chooses an initial drug from a group of reasonable
alternatives in the market-the physician does a risk-benefit analysis of
the drug "in light of other alternatives."' 32 The Reporters chide Conk:
Conk's suggestion that the new Restatement requires the
hypothetical prescribing physician to focus exclusively on
the risks and benefits of a given drug in isolation, wearing
blinders that prevent consideration of other readily
available drugs, attributes a meaning to Section 6(c) that
would require that physician to violate her Hippocratic oath
... [T]he blinders Conk reads into Section 6(c).. .would
otherwise constitute a gratuitous insult to the medical
profession.... 133
Actually, in clinical practice, Conk's suggestion of doing a risk-
benefit analysis of a drug "in isolation"'134 is also correct. Physicians do
a risk-benefit analysis of prescription drugs "in isolation" after
choosing a particular drug from all available drugs in the market. They
then do a second mental analysis on how the drug will affect their
individual patients. Based on an individual patient's unique medical
history, taking into consideration multiple factors such as age, gender,
130 See Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability § 6(c) (stating "that reasonable
health care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits,
would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients").
131 See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 13.
132 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 156-57. It is crucial to note that,
actually, the most important accomplishments of a physician are not procedures or
drug prescriptions per se, but rather, the judgments from which these and all other
aspects of clinical therapy flow. It is easy for patients and laymen to overlook the
crucial importance of this elusive mental activity, especially in our era of fast-paced
diagnostic and therapeutic equipment (DANIEL MARK, Decision-making in Clinical
Medicine, in HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE (Anthony Fauci et. al.,
eds. 15th ed. 2001) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 15th ed.].




genetic predisposition, patient clinical exam, and diagnostic results,
among others, the physician then determines whether the known
benefits of his particular drug of choice will exceed its potential
harmful risks for the particular patient. For example, traditionally, the
treatment of choice for severe clostridial infection 135 has been the
antibiotic penicillin G. However, if a physician has determined that his
patient is sensitive or allergic to penicillin G, he will change this choice
to suit his patient. 136 Should a physician then choose an antibiotic like
chloramphenicol, but finds out, during the course of treatment, that the
patient is resistant to the drug, again, he will alter his choice. The
medical process of doing a risk-benefit or net-benefit analysis of a drug
in "isolation" may be done during the course of patient therapy or on a
patient's succeeding visits.
Indeed, as pointed out by the Reporters, there are times when
physicians may "misprescribe" a well-designed, but risky, drug. 137 He
may fail to heed clear and adequate warnings to guard against risks to
patients as stated in the package insert, 138 or he may not relay warnings
to his patient, I39 or he may not obtain his patient's informed consent
140
13' Bacteria of the genus Clostridium are gram-positive, spore-forming rodlike
bacteria. Infections associated with clostridium bacteria range from localized
wound infection to overwhelming systemic disease. Examples include: tetanus on
contaminated wounds, food and intestinal poisoning, blood poisoning, among others
DENNIS KASPER & DORI ZLENZNIK, Gas Gangrene, Antibiotic-Associated Colitis, and
other Clostridial Infections, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 115, at
906-910.
136 Penicillin sensitivity may have varied effects in different patients. In
patients with impaired renal function, allergy to penicillin can manifest with severe
seizures. In other patients, penicillin may induce serious hypersensitivity reactions.
GORDON ARCHER, R, ONALD POLK Treatment and Prophylaxis of Bacterial
Infections, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 115, at 865. See also
WILLIAM PETRI, Antimicrobial Agents: Penicillins, Cephalosporins, and Other fi-
Lactam Antibiotics, in PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS, infra note 156, at 1204.
137 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 174.
138 See, e.g., Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for Some but Not
Others: The FDA Experience & Alternatives for Products Liability, 36 HOuS. L. REV.
927, 945 (1999); Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Minn. 1970)
(using the drug product contrary to a drug manufacturer's recommendations is prima
facie evidence of negligence by the physician).
B39 See id., at 942; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, supra note
88, § 6 cmt. b
140 Informed consent is an ethical guideline in the practice of medicine that
requires physicians to discuss with his patient the nature of the proposed care, the
alternatives and the risks and benefits of each. Whenever a risky procedure is
involved in therapy, rule of thumb is to go with the patient's informed decision. The
warnings from the manufacturer as stated in the package insert provide the means by
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regarding the use of the drug despite its adverse effects. It can also
happen that because of a negligent approach to obtaining information
regarding his patient's medical history, physical examination, or
diagnostic work-up, the patient suffers an adverse consequence. When
these scenarios happen, liability should indeed fall on the negligent
physician. Nevertheless, when a physician makes a clinical judgment 14 1
for his individual patient, the final choice of drug therapy is based on
his personal knowledge, experience, and belief that the drug,
notwithstanding its known harmful risks to another patient, will be
maximally tailored to benefit that particular patient.
Thus, it follows that almost every drug out on the market, no
matter how risky, will not be subject to manufacturer design liability
according to section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third). Once a physician
prescribes such as drug and has weighed the foreseeable risks of the
drug in "light of all other alternatives" and in "isolation," he has
already established that prescribed drug to be beneficial and
"reasonably safe" for that particular patient.
c. When Manufacturer Design-based Liability Can
Occur
What then is the legal standard for defectively designed drugs?
To this query, in their essay "Drug Designs are Different," 142 the
Reporters mention three scenarios: (1) when such a drug does not
provide any net benefit to any class of patients; (2) when such a drug
should never had been marketed in the first place; and (3) when a
plaintiff can show that alternative safer drugs were available in the
market, which physicians would have prescribed in place of a
defendant's drug for all classes of patients.
which physicians learn about unavoidable risks of the product. The burden is now
upon the doctor to ensure that his patient makes an informed decision regarding use of
the risky drug. See e.g., Introduction to Clinical Medicine, in PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 115, at 4. See also Gilhooley, supra note 138, at
947.
141 See, e.g., LEE GOLDMAN, Quantitative Aspects of Clinical Reasoning, in
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICINE pt. 3, at 9 (Anthony Fauci et. al., eds. 14th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF MEDICINE 14th ed.].
142 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8.
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i. When Such a Drug Provides No Net Benefit to Any Class of
Patients14
3
As Mr. James H. Henderson of the Reporters explains, "The
emphasized language clearly indicates that if one class of patients is
found to exist for whom the defendant's drug is the one of choice, then
it is not defective."'
144
To assume that a particular prescription drug out in the market
would not benefit any "class of patients" or any patient, is an
assumption that is superficially plausible, yet misguided in its approach
when one considers that unless some form of demand or need for a
product exists, a manufacturer will not provide for such. Like any
business entity, before a drug manufacturer invests in a business
venture, he knows that there already exists a demand for the drug
product, he is certain that there exists a niche of consumers (i.e. "class
of patients") who will need his product and support its sales once it is
launched into the market. Basic business sense dictates that he will not
venture into drug development blindly without thorough knowledge of
the drug market; he has done an extensive market research on his
product; he has done strategic analysis on the costs of production, how
the specific operations and distribution network will proceed, the
projected market share of his product, and the potential return of
investment over a set time period. He knows a good deal about his
customer profile: who his patients are, and the degree of their buying
power. He has consulted physicians on what types of patients will need
the potential drug, notwithstanding its known adverse effects.
Furthermore, the manufacturer has done research on specific medical
practitioners who will most frequently prescribe his product. The
manufacturer knows all about the prescription drug market and more.
Therefore, through significant market research, the result is an
underlying confidence that there already exists an initial "class of
patients" who will need the drug and who will support its sales via the
recommendation of a learned intermediary once the product is released
into the market.
How then could a plaintiff prevail on a design defect claim?
Richard L. Cupp Jr. attempts to explain,
143 Id. at 174.
144 James A. Henderson, Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the
Proposed Restatement (Third of Torts): A Reporter's Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L.
REv. 471, 490 (1996).
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If a plaintiff can show that the reasonably foreseeable risks
posed by a drug are so great that a reasonable health-care
provider, who is informed of the risks, would not prescribe
the drug to any patient then the design is defective and the
plaintiff is entitled to recovery from the manufacturer. 145
Logistically, a plaintiff needs to locate a representative
physician to testify that he will not prescribe the drug or device to any
class of patients, thereby permitting a design defect liability.1
46
However, finding a representative physician to testify that he
will not prescribe the prescription drug or medical device to any class
of patients is almost impossible because of this crucial concept: a
physician knows that select colleagues in the medical/scientific
community work in solid partnership with industry manufacturers in all
technical aspects of the prescription drug market: from
conceptualization of the drug, to development, to safety and efficacy
clinical trials to manufacturing operations, and its final distribution to
patients.
Although there are cases when drugs are withdrawn from the
market post-sale, at that point in time, when a private physician
prescribes a drug, even if it is a new risky drug, there is a margin of
confidence that the drug is safe because he trusts that his colleagues
have tested and re-tested the drug for safety and efficacy for a period of
years before the drug is released into the market. Needless to say,
when a drug or therapeutic device is released into the market, it has
undergone extensive consultation and evaluation with the medical
profession. The very same professionals will be responsible for the
distribution, consumption and sale of their products-ensures the
manufacturer that there exists a market, a niche of patients, for whom
the drug would be prescribed, once the product is released into the
market.
Thus, when the Reporters suggest that Section 6(c) requires a
plaintiff to find a physician to testify that he would not prescribe the
drug or medical device for any class of patients, this solution is
practically unworkable because the manufacturer collaborates with and
145 Cupp, supra note 13, at 248 (citing Andrew Barrett, Note, The Past and
Future of Comment k: Section (4)(B)(4) of the Tentative Draft Restatement (Third) of
Torts - Is It the Beginning of a New Era for Prescription Drugs?, 45 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1291, 1324 (1995).
146 Id. at 244-46.
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relies on the medical/scientific profession in all aspects of drug
development, from clinical testing, to (FDA) regulation until its
distribution to the consumer. This establishes the fact that even before
the drug reaches the market, the network of physician involvement and
support (in industry, government, and colleagues in private practice)
guarantees that there already exists a class of patients who will need the
drug and to whom it will be prescribed once it hits the market. In other
words, it is almost impossible for a physician to testify that such a drug
provides no net benefits to any class of patients or "should never have
been marketed in the first place, ' 147 when he himself knows that the
initial need for that drug has already been established by expert
colleagues, select members of the medical profession who are involved
in drug conceptualization and development in conjunction with the
manufacturer.
Therefore, the phraseology, "that reasonable health care
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits,
would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients," as applied to the rule of Section 6(c) would hardly find any
application. Through the extensive network of physician involvement
and support, the manufacturer is confident that there already exists a
market niche-a class of patients, who will be prescribed the
medication, and who will benefit from the drug product once it is
released into the market. The logistic unworkability of this approach in
court is illustrated by this example: plaintiffs in the court in Sita v.
Danek Medical148 asserted that a manufacturer defectively designed a
surgical screw system. However, the defendants presented "an
impressive compendium" of 270 surgeons' testimony that the use of the
medical device was helpful and appropriate.
149
ii. When Such a Drug Should Never Have Been Marketed in
the First Place
The Reporters assert that design-based liability can be imposed
when a drug should never have been marketed in the first place.
150
Although there are occasions when drugs have been withdrawn
from the market, most drugs that reach the market have undergone, as
147 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 174.
148 Cupp, supra note 13, at 244 (citing Sita v. Danek Medical, Inc. 43 F. Supp.
2d 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
149 Id.
150 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 174.
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explained above, an extensive risk-benefit analysis of safety and
efficacy: first, by physicians and scientists who have done clinical
research together with the manufacturer in conceptualizing and
developing the drug; and second, by competent physicians and
scientists who work in conjunction with the FDA.
Nevertheless, granted that design-based liability can be imposed
when such a drug should never have been marketed in the first place,
the Reporters explain that, "...Section 6(c) tacitly assumes that the
FDA will occasionally approve or (fail to order withdrawal of) a drug
that should not be allowed on the market. ,,I5I This situation is,
however, rare.
iii. When a Plaintiff Can Show that Alternative Safer Drugs
were Available in the Market, which Physicians would have
Prescribed in Place of a Defendant's Drug for All Classes of
Patients
The Reporters assure critics that "plaintiffs may establish
defectiveness by showing that alternative safer drugs were available on
the market that reasonable health care providers would have prescribed
in place of a defendant's drug for all classes of patients. 152 Although
medical books are written about signs and symptoms of specific
medical conditions, a physician's approach to his patient is not
textbook-based because even as textbooks explain general signs and
symptoms of that disease, a physician may be faced with an individual
patient who does not exhibit the standard signs and symptoms of that
particular disease entity.
A physician treats each patient as a unique individual. Every
therapeutic encounter with an individual patient is personal and special.
Thus, it must be emphasized that a physician's approach regarding the
choice of drug for his patient is individualized.
In addition to unlimited human variables which interact with
drug metabolism, many other variables influence a physician's
prescribing practice: his personal knowledge, training, and bias from
experience-all of which are shaped by powerful, sometimes perverse,
external forces.1 53 Thus, no two physicians are exactly alike in drug
prescribing practices, even among specialists of the same medical field.
151 Id.
1521 Id. at 152.
153 MARK, supra note 134, at 8-14.
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It is crucial to understand the extent of variable considerations
a physician must face in medical practice, how unlimited patient
variables are, how the combinations of such factors can affect the
presentation of the same disease entity, and how infinite the
interactions range between patient factors and drug factors. This is
why physicians can never assure the safety or efficacy of a drug in an
individual patient. 154  Even if two patients seek consultation for the
same medical condition, no two patients will have exactly the same
medical history, no two patients will exhibit exactly the same clinical
symptoms and severity of disease.
Thus, any slight change in patient variables or severity of
disease coupled with the patient's opinion on the effectiveness of the
prescribed drug will alter a physician's choice of therapeutic strategy
for that individual. Therefore, it cannot be prescribed for all classes of
patients within the same medical condition or disease entity. There
hardly exists a single alternative drug, which a physician will prescribe
to all classes of patients within the same medical condition or disease.
a. A Note on the Use of the Phraseology "Class of Patients"
Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) uses the phraseology,
"class of patients." In the field of medicine, an absolute number of
"class of drugs" may exist, but the term "class of patients" cannot be
numerically quantified. "Classes of patients" can be continually created
and can be observed by one physician and not by another. Unlimited
patient variables, which exist in combination with different drug
interactive factors and which can be discovered every time a physician
sees a patient, may constantly create new, emerging "classes of
patients" just as easily as science has discovered new uses for old, risky
drugs like Thalidomide.
In the 1960s, Thalidomide's original use was as a sedative. Yet,
it created a massive public panic when it was discovered to cause
severe and life-threatening (teratogenic) birth defects when
administered to pregnant women. Today, medical science has
discovered a new use for the drug-one that is unrelated to
Thalidomide's original use as a sedative. The FDA has approved the
drug for the treatment of a "class" of patients with leprosy, specifically
for the "sub-sub class" of those suffering from lepra reactions, known
154 ALAN NIES, Principles of Therapeutics, in GOODMAN & GILMAN'S: THE
PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 45-58 (Joel Hardman & Lee Limbird
eds., 10th ed., 2001) [hereinafter PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS].
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as erythema nodosum leprosum or ENL, manifestations of which may
include painful skin lesions and high fever.1
55
One may ask if there exists alternative drugs in treating ENL
which are not teratogenic like Thalidomide-the answer is yes.
Alternatives range from antipyretics to steroid drugs (glucocorticoids).
Still, as mentioned earlier, a physician's approach to treating his patient
is individualized. If ENL manifestations in a patient are mild (i.e.
without fever or other organ involvement, with only a few skin lesions),
patients may be treated with antipyretics alone. 156 In patients with
many skin lesions, fever, malaise, and other tissue involvement,
glucocorticoids are effective. 157 However, if ENL appears to be
recurring and persisting, it is recommended that Thalidomide therapy
be initiated. 158 Although alternative glucocorticoids do not possess the
teratogenic effects of Thalidomide, a patient who has undergone
prolonged treatment with glucocorticoids may also suffer from some of
its life threatening toxic effects, which include adrenal suppression,
metabolic effects (growth inhibition, diabetes, muscle wasting,
osteoporosis), salt retention, and psychosis. 159 In these types of
patients, the steroid-sparing drug, Thalidomide, may be the only avenue
in preventing morbidity associated with ENL.
Under Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third), in light of
available alternatives like glucocorticoids in treating ENL, the fact that
Thalidomide is useful in treating ENL but may cause birth defects does
not mean that the manufacturer has defectively designed the drug.
Thalidomide should not be defective, because it must be made available
to a class of patients who suffer from ENL, albeit warnings are required
to alert pregnant users of disastrous side effects.
Interestingly, Thalidomide is also today a new and experimental
drug in the treatment of new, emerging "classes of patients:" those with
Inflammatory Bowel Disease (IBD), those with Crohn's disease (a
155 See, e.g., ROBERT GELBER, Leprosy (Hansen's Disease) in PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICINE - 15th ed., supra note 131, at 1035-40; S. Tseng et al., Rediscovering
Thalidomide: A Review of its Mechanism of Action, Side Effects and Potential Uses,
35 J. AM. ACAD. OF DERMATOLOGY, 969 (1996); J.M. Jacobson et al., Thalidomide
for the Treatment of Oral Aphthous Ulcers in Patients with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases AIDS Clinical
Trials Group, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1487 (1997).






chronic disease of the gastrointestinal tract),16 and a "class of patients"
with severe, refractory rheumatoid arthritis.' 61
Through a typical example of the use of Thalidomide in ENL,
one can now visualize the workings of the healer's craft: because
physicians treat each patient as an individual, it is important to
understand that the choice of drug therapy, considered to be risky for
one patient, may be beneficial to another. A "dangerous" drug not
normally prescribed to a general number of patients may be needed by
another patient or a select class of patients. Similarly, if a physician
does not detect a toxic effect in one particular patient, it does not mean
that it will not occur in others.' 6 2 Additionally, although alternative
drugs exist in the market which are known to be safe from a particular
adverse event, these alternative drugs may still cause other unavoidable
adverse reactions, which may pose to be more serious in another
"class" of patients. Thus, even if a second safer alternative drug in the
market exists, to the judgment and experience of a clinically trained
eye, a drug may still have medical benefits for a certain class or sub-
class of patients, depending on each patient's unique medical need.
The Reporters attempt to assure critics that "plaintiffs may
establish defectiveness by showing that alternative safer drugs were
available on the market that reasonable health care providers would
have prescribed in place of a defendant's drug for all classes of
patients.
'' 6 3
However, in actual medical practice, such concept is unworkable.
First, because a physician's approach to treatment is governed by the
principle of "individualized patient therapy" and not therapy, as applied
to "all classes of patients." Second, the phraseology, "class of patients"
as stated in Section 6(c), which attempts to picture a definite numeric
boundary of types of patients and disease entities, is inapplicable in the
field of medicine. Science continually discovers new emerging classes
of patients for whom a defendant's risky drug can still benefit, and
would still be prescribed by some physician, even if such a drug has
been removed from the market, as shown by the Thalidomide example.
160 SYED JAFRI & PANKAJ PASRICHA, Agents Used for Diarrhea, Constipation,
and Inflammatory Bowel Disease; Agents Used for Biliary and Pancreatic Disease, in
PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS, supra note 153, at 1054.
161 Id. See also N. Keesal et al., Thalidomide in the Treatment of Refractory
Rheumatoid Arthritis, 26 J. RHEUMATOLOGY 2344 (1999).
162 NIES, supra note 153, at 48.
163 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 152 (emphasis added).
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Impracticability of the concept can further be illustrated in court
when questions like these arise: how many physicians do you need to
testify in order to establish that they would all opt to prescribe an
alternative safer drug in the market? Suppose one hundred physicians
agree that they would prescribe alternative drugs, but still one physician
opts to prescribe the defendant's drug, would that drug be defective? 164
From the above explanation, it not difficult to see that the
Section 6(c) phraseology, "that reasonable health-care providers,
knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients..." is an
unworkable concept as applied to medical practice, a concept that
considerably narrows the standard of liability of manufacturers.'65
d. Under the Restatement (Third), a Plaintiff cannot
argue that a Drug Manufacturer Should Have Developed a Safer
Alternative Drug
The Reporters provide a convincing argument that the
Restatement (Third) is correct in not allowing plaintiffs to argue that a
drug manufacturer should have developed a safer alternative drug: it is
impossible for courts to replicate the FDA approval process. As
Michael Green and the Reporters point out, "With such careful
regulatory oversight, we need not have tort law (and inexpert juries)
second-guessing FDA expert determinations."
167
Certainly, on the surface, the FDA is almost "fail-safe." But
Conk, along with legal scholars and critics of Section 6(c), point out
one crucial factor: the FDA is not per se involved in initiating or
conceptualizing prescription drug or vaccine design, 168 nor does the
164 Cupp, supra note 13, at 244-47.
165 Conk, supra note 14; Cupp, supra note 13; Green, supra note 13. These
authors, along with other critics, prove a point: The reasonable physician standard of
§ 6(c) of the Third Restatement has been described as a standard that in effect will
hardly allow any liability.
166 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 163-64.
167 Green, Prescription Drugs, supra note 13, at 220-21.
168 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006) (describing criteria for FDA approval or
rejection of NDA-- the FDA has a general picture of the drug, and approves it when,
after evaluation of documents it has decided that benefits of the new drug outweighs
its risks); see also Dixie Farley, Benefit vs. Risk: How FDA Approves New Drugs, 21
FDA CONSUMER MAG. 7 (Dec. 1987- Jan. 1988).
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agency actively test for optimum drug design.' 69 Whether a drug can
be redesigned in order to improve its therapeutic benefit-to-risk ratio is
not a task assigned to the FDA. The FDA does not examine whether
there were other safer, more efficacious, alternative designs of drug
available to the manufacturer, which he could have employed in the
processing of his drug product. 170 Conceptualizing the particular
details of drug or vaccine design that may spell the difference between
safety and risk emanates from the creativity of a manufacturer who has
the financial resources to capitalize on patents and licensing rights, the
scientific specifications of which largely remain a secret. 171
Still, the only other way to ascertain the highest quality of
safety and efficacy is to consider new scientific strategies of designing
and improving a prescription drug or vaccine, but this avenue reaches a
dead-end when the Reporters assert that the Restatement (Third) only
allows courts to consider only alternatives that have received FDA
approval.
172
e. The Tort System Must Not Remove from the Market an
Beneficial Drug for a Certain Class of Patients
The Reporters are correct in their concern that the tort system
must not remove prescription drugs from the market, no matter how
risky they may be, because to do so, may deprive another class of
patients access to the same drug for whom it is deemed beneficial.
173
This is exemplified by Thalidomide and OPV. Furthermore, scientific
research may find breakthrough therapeutic discoveries using old
drugs in combination with new strategies.
However, the crux of the issue here is not the removal of such
products from the market, but to guarantee that one who produces it is
monitored for possible negligence. Leave the product on the market-
just make sure that producers are doing everything scientifically
169 See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1775-76 (1996) (explaining that the FDA is
basically a passive, non-initiating organization).
170 See, e.g., Gilhooley, supra note 138; PETER B. HUTT & RICHARD MERRILL,
FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1178-1206 (2d ed. 1991); Green,
supra note 13.
171 See discussion infra Part VI.B.2. See also Conk, The Real Test, supra note
113.
172 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 162-67.
173 Id at 168-70.
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possible to "clean up" the vaccines, and simply discard those that are
contaminated with dangerous matter.
3. An Analysis of the Restatement (Third), Section 6(c) Standard
of Design Defect
From a medical-scientific view, the authors observe some
important facets of Section 6(c)'s constructs and phraseologies that
according to the Reporters make drug designs different. Interestingly,
the authors observe subtle dynamic effects of such reasoning on the
psyche of the lawyer.
The Reporters claim that the Restatement (Third) has been
"misread," incorrectly interpreted, and that it does not exempt drug
manufacturers for defective design. 174 In fact, they reason that the
Restatement (Third) does allow courts to consider already marketed
alternatives. 175 However, to this rule, very narrow standards of liability
seem to attach: conditions that will almost always shield manufacturers
from liability, and divert thorough scrutiny of the rule of Section 6(c)
away from an intelligent lawyer.
First, lawyers are pacified by the reasoning that the Restatement
(Third) does allow courts to consider already marketed alternatives.
However, doing this would entail a risk-benefit assessment or a net-
benefit assessment of available drugs in the market by expert medical
practitioners, which, from a medical perspective, is an unworkable
standard for manufacturer design-based liability. It is unworkable
because generally, every drug out in the market will benefit a patient.
Once a drug is prescribed, a physician has already taken into
consideration the multiple patient variables, drug interaction variables,
and other variables that affect disease progression, and has determined
that the foreseeable therapeutic benefits of the drug are sufficiently
great in relation to its foreseeable risks of harm. In other words, based
on the rule of Section 6(c), any drug (including those that have been
withdrawn from the market), once prescribed by a physician would not
be subject to a design-based defect, because the physician has already
established the drug to be beneficial and "reasonably safe" for that
particular patient at that particular time period.
In effect, the use of the "net-benefit" or "risk-benefit" test
already acts as a frontline shield against a manufacturer's responsibility
of producing the most technologically superior and safe prescription
1741d. at 152.175 Id. at 155-156.
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drug and vaccine design, by limiting manufacturer responsibility under
the assumption of learned intermediary expertise. Yet, such assumption
suffers from incongruence because in the reality of medical practice,
private physicians essentially rely on manufacturer expertise.
Second, the Reporters assert that, "as long as one or more
classes of patients need a particular drug, it should not effectively be
removed from the market by judicial decree."' 176 However, the issue is
not to drive the biologic away from the market, because
unquestionably, such products must be available to those who need
them. Further, the issue does not pertain to a "no-win" choice between
contaminated blood transfusion, or no transfusion at all, in the way
Conk explains, his hemophiliacs had to choose. 177 Nor does the issue
pertain to a choice of whether or not the immediate benefits of OPV
vaccination in preventing crippling polio outweigh the risk of
contracting a latent disease like cancer in the future, because clearly
world eradication of polio is a must.
The critical issue is to guarantee that a manufacturer has
fulfilled his responsibility as expert. The manufacturer must use his
resources to analyze all possible alternative scientific designs available
at present, in order to guarantee the highest quality of safety and
efficacy of such products that enter the human body. No choice should
be necessary when there exists alternative, safer, more efficacious
scientific designs which an expert manufacturer can create to clean up
blood products or vaccines.
Third, the Restatement (Third) intimidates the lawyers when it
plays them against FDA expertise. The Reporters reason that courts
cannot replicate the huge financial investments and the work involved
in drug development' 78 Of course, the concept of "FDA expertise"
plays well when accepted by the lawyer, because it can then be asserted
that "The Restatement is correct in not allowing plaintiffs to argue that
a drug manufacturer should have developed a safer alternative drug"
that has not received FDA approval. 179 Still, as explained above, the
FDA process is not entirely fail-safe because the agency does not
initiate the conceptualization of prescription drug or vaccine design; it
generally relies on manufacturer expertise.
76 Id. at 168-75 (explaining that "Restatement Rejects an Aggregative, All-
Patients - Considered Approach to Defective Drug Design").
177 Conk, supra note 14, at 1107-14.
178 Id. at 164-67.
179 Id. at 153, 175-80.
2008]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
Fourth, the Reporters' assumption that the prescription drug
industry gives full disclosure of their marketing practices to the
medical-scientific community or to the FDA is naive. 18° Obviously, in
a highly competitive, patent-controlled industry, secrecy rules. "Micro-
scientific details," which may spell the difference between safety and
risk, calibrated against cost efficiency and business expansion, remain
internal to a manufacturer.
In the event of litigation based on design defect, plaintiffs are
up against the insurmountable obstacle of credibly proving that an
alternative method of decontaminating blood or oral polio vaccines is
reasonably available at the time of sale.' 81 Defendants are prepared to
play the game. Even if plaintiffs call in scientific expert witnesses who
believe that there are currently available alternative modem molecular
methods of screening for the SV40 virus in polio vaccines, defendants
can easily respond that such methods are already undergoing
experimentation, and that such methods could not yet be implemented
at the time the plaintiff suffered injury. Defendants can then establish
that such molecular techniques will be implemented as soon as they are
technologically able to do so. This is the way plaintiffs in Conk's
contaminated blood cases lost, as asserted by the Reporters.
1 82
Therefore, based on the rule of Section 6(c), cancer victims of
SV40-contaminated vaccines are not expected to prevail on a design-
based litigation, in precisely the same manner that Conk's victims of
viral-contaminated blood products did not stand a chance.
B. Manufacturing Defect
Differentiating a design defect from a manufacturing defect can
be difficult. Henderson and Twerski chide Conk:
Before reaching the merits of Conk's argument, some
conceptual confusion must be eliminated.., the
contaminants that caused their harm constituted
manufacturing defects for which manufacturers are
generally held strictly liable under section 2(a) of the new
Restatement... Thus, when Conk argues that application of
the RAD-based design standard in section 2(b) would have
produced different outcomes in the blood cases, from a
"0°Id. at 178-80.
181 Id. at 161.
182 Conk, supra note 14, at 161.
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technical standpoint, he is mixing apples with oranges...
183
The Code of Federal Regulations defines the term
"manufacture" as follows: "Manufacturing means all steps in
propagation or manufacture and preparation of products and includes
but is not limited to filling, testing, labeling, packaging and storage by
the manufacturer." 184 In other words, the manufacturing process
includes all the steps, methods and processes utilized in making the
final product until it reaches the consumer. A product contains a
manufacturing defect when "the product departs from its intended
design. ' 8 5 It fails to meet the manufacturer's quality standards or fails
to perform its intended function.186 Only a small number of individual
products in a product line will contain manufacturing defects.1 87 On
the other hand, in the context of a design defect, every product in the
assembly line will be defective.
1 88
In the case of a manufacturing defect, the manufacturer will be
liable for harm caused by the defect despite the fact that he exercised
all possible care in preparing and marketing the product."' For
example, the court in the American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell noted that
alleged pesticide residues in tobacco, even if they "may be found in
many if not all cigarettes," is a manufacturing defect rather than a
design defect, because the residues were "not an ingredient American
intended to incorporate into its cigarettes."
'1 90
In the case of a design defect, the manufacturer's standards of
quality are being challenged. 191 It might meet the manufacturer's
specifications and quality standards but will still be unreasonably
dangerous.1 92 Because it is a manufacturer's standards which are being
challenged, such standards cannot be used to determine whether a
183 Id. at 160.
184 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(u) (2006)(emphasis in original).
185 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(a) (referring to
products that are physically flawed, damaged, or incorrectly assembled).
186 See James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512-16
(1992); Rutherford, supra note 89, at 233.
187 See Rutherford, supra note 89, at 233.
188 Id. at 229.
189 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(a).
190 951 S.W.2d 420, 434 (Tex. 1997).
191 See Rutherford, supra note 89, at 233.
192 Id.
2008]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
product is defective in design. Rather, courts must resort to standards of
reasonableness as an independent standard. 93
With respect to Conk's contaminated blood products, during the
1970s, the use of heat pasteurization as a method to inactivate blood-
borne viruses was reportedly undergoing scientific research 194 and was
therefore not yet employed as part of the manufacturing process of the
final blood product. Every blood product distributed to consumers at
that time, carried with it a hundred percent risk of being contaminated
with Hepatitis, HIV, or both. Thus, Conk's contaminated blood
products as referred to at the time period of the 1970s, falls under the
rule of design defect. The manufacturer's standards of quality are
being challenged-i.e., whether he could have employed a reasonable
alternative design to decontaminate the unsafe blood products at that
time. It follows then, that at the given time period, Conk's blood cases
were still subject to an evaluation of design defect as stated in Section
6(c)-not under a manufacturing defect or the strict liability rule of
Section 2(a).
Only after the FDA has licensed and approved the heat
pasteurization method to decontaminate blood products and once
manufacturers employ such method and incorporate it as part of their
standards of safety and quality, may blood products be subject to a
manufacturing defect as stated in the rule of Section 2(a).
Henceforth, every blood product on the production line must
undergo the heat pasteurization method to guarantee its safety. Should
a hypothetical blood product escape the heat pasteurization process
through error or otherwise and is found to be contaminated, that
product is of a different quality from that intended and could be
considered a manufacturing defect.
The distinction of whether a defect is design-based or
manufacturing-based is critical. In the case of a manufacturing defect,
the Restatement (Third) does not require proof of an existing alternative
design-the rule imposes liability regardless of whether the defendant's
quality control efforts comply with standards of reasonableness,' 95 as
stated in section 2(a) of the Restatement (Third).
193 Id.; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (b).
194 Conk, supra note 14, at 1109, 1109 n.25 (citing a report from The Institute of
Medicine, HIV and the Blood Supply: An Analysis of Crisis Decision-making 223
(1995)).
195 See Rutherford, supra note 89, at 233. See also Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 8, at 160.
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It should be made clear that whether the defect is one that
involves manufacturing or design, the crucial characteristic of a safe
biologic like blood in Conk's example, or a vaccine in this case, is its
purity-the guarantee that all manufacturing and testing procedures
used in production of the final vaccine eliminates any microbial or viral
agent capable of producing human disease.' 
96
In parallel, lawyer Stanley Kop's challenge on whether a
manufacturer could have employed new molecular methods to clean up
or screen for contaminated SV40 in vaccines or not,' 97 is a matter of
design defect as stated in Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third)
because he challenges manufacturers' current standards of quality and
safety. If manufacturers know that there exists at the time scientific
knowledge regarding reasonable modem molecular techniques to
screen vaccines against a cancer-producing virus like SV40, yet still not
use them because of concern with economy or profit, then evidently,
they should be held liable.
C. Warning Defect
A manufacturer has a duty to warn not only of risks or side-
effects of the marketed drug, but also risks that are discovered
subsequent to its distribution. 98 After SV40's forty-year history of
contamination in polio vaccines, the official package insert' 99 of the
polio vaccines marketed in the U.S. in 1999 that are addressed to
physicians and health care providers regarding product risks only has
this statement of precaution regarding carcinogenesis: "Long term
196 See 21 C.F.R. § 630.10-630.19 (1996) (instructing "if any extraneous agent
is present at the time of viral harvest, the viral harvest should not be used for
poliovirus manufacture. Or if any test or observation demonstrates the presence of
any microbial agent known to be capable of producing human disease, the virus
grown in each tissue culture preparation should not be used for vaccine production).
197 Kops, supra note 76, at 4747.
198 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b), 6 cmt. d. In the
absence of federal preemption, compliance with FDA warnings is not dispositive of
liability. Thus, "[f]ailure to instruct or wam is the major basis of liability for
manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical devices." See also e.g., Jeffrey N.
Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and Products
Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L. J. 194, 228 (1987).
199 The package insert (warnings) is a cooperative effort between the FDA and
the pharmaceutical company directing physicians on the use of the product. It
contains basic pharmacological information, as well as essential clinical information
in regard to approved indications, contraindications, precautions, warnings, adverse
reactions, usual dosage, and available preparations.
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studies in animals to evaluate carcinogenic potential.. .have not been
conducted.... ,200
1. Scientifically Unknowable Risk
The critical aspect with respect to warnings is information.
Obviously, a manufacturer cannot be held liable for failure to warn of
"scientifically unknowable" risks 20 -risks which are not known or
knowable, until the product has been out in the market for some time.
The FDA has emphasized that package labels should be
supported by scientific evidence 202 and has advised only of "known
hazards and not theoretical possibilities. 20 3 For a plaintiff to establish
proof of what could have been known, would be tedious, confusing and
costly. 2°4 It would require a medical/scientific debate among experts,
with differing opinions and ideas regarding scientific concepts and
theoretical possibilities.
20 5
The warning approach is beset with more obstacles than might
initially appear. First, a plaintiff would have to establish that there is
SV40 contamination in the oral polio vaccine and second, that the
SV40 contamination is the direct cause of his cancer injury. The
second obstacle is the bigger one, the source of our polio vaccine
controversy-causation.
200 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 528 (53d ed. 1999); MOSBY'S GEN RX: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE FOR GENERIC AND BRAND PRESCRIPTION 1983-84 (11 th
ed. 2001).
201 See generally, Richard Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products
Liability: What Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical
Products?, 78 KY. L. J. 705 (1990).
202 Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for
Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,441 (June 26, 1979)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201-02).
203 See generally Ausness, supra note 201, at 731-34.
204 Id.
205 See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due
Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998); Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific




Establishing that an adverse event is caused by exposure to an
agent (e.g. to a vaccine) can be a tiresome and tedious process.2 °6
Courts have dismissed OPV vaccine-related claims involving other
conditions such as transverse myelitis (an inflammatory disease of the
spinal cord) and Guillain-barre Syndrome based on the lack of proof of
causation.207 Likewise, a serious vaccine-associated adverse event like
cancer will not permit easy inferences on causality.
In the scientific framework, the first question that can be raised
is whether the association with OPV vaccination can either produce a
carcinogenic outcome or induce it in certain high-risk populations.20 8
Secondly, is the association purely coincidental and vaccination is
blamed because it is a highly distinctive, memorable event followed by
local and systemic manifestations such as swelling at the injection site
and fever?2° 9 Thirdly, the common simplified approach used in the
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 21° is to assume that adverse
events occur at a particular time period, ranging from hours to
months. 211 Yet, what if an adverse event like SV-40 tumor formation
occurs after a latent period of time-say, after twenty years later?
Still, the main problem in scientific research with regard to
viruses like SV40 is the weighty opinion of world-renowned science
experts. While Dr. Carbone together with many laboratories from all
over the world report the presence of SV40 DNA in human tumor
tissues, prominent scientists Dr. Strickler and Dr. Shah report that none
212
of their tumor specimens tested were clearly positive for SV40 DNA.
Such experts play a major role in the credibility of scientific
information such that results obtained from rigorously conducted
206 See ROBERT CHEN, Safety of Vaccines, in VACCINES 3rd ed. supra note 18, at
1150-51 (describing the process to prove causality between exposure to an agent and
an adverse event).
207 See generally, KITCH ET AL., supra note 31, at 1181.
208 See CHEN, supra note 206, at 1150 (describing process to prove causality
between exposure to an agent and an adverse event).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1147-49, 1157-59; see also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
211 See generally CHEN, supra note 206 (concluding that there should be a longer
timeline to asses effects of vaccines that have a longer latency period before adverse
events are noticeable).
212 Id.; see also The International SV40 Working Group, A Multicenter Evaluation of
Assays for Detection of SV40 DNA and Results in Masked Mesothelioma Specimens,
10 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 523 (2001).
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scientific studies are less satisfying than their consensus. 213 Basically
then, a manufacturer's obligation to warn, coupled with FDA's
standards to warn, will rely heavily on the credibility of scientific
information to-date. Ultimately, the ability of judges and juries to
make appropriate decisions regarding this issue is suspect in the face of
214conflicting scientific evidence. But, what if such expert scientists are
found to be misrepresenting their findings or their findings are not
based on the most up-to-date molecular techniques and scientific
processes? Aside from the defense of being a scientifically
unknowable risk, manufacturers of SV40-contaminated polio vaccines
can escape warning liability by asserting that compliance with FDA
standards relieves them from a warning defect liability (FDA regulatory
compliance defense).215
The FDA is meticulous in its job regulating the format and
contents of the labels for product containers and package inserts,
216
such that compliance with FDA regulations has been considered
"compelling evidence that the manufacturer has satisfied its duty to
warn the physician."2 7 In this light, the Reporters remark that should a
manufacturer be found to misrepresent his findings to the FDA, the
plaintiff can have classic failure-to-warn claims against the
manufacturer to redress the resulting injury. 218
Within the context of SV40-contaminated vaccines, a claim that
a manufacturer has misrepresented data to the FDA would require
tedious logistic processes and excessive costs. First, medical-scientific
experts would need to analyze all the steps and procedures involved in
polio vaccine manufacture and examine them in detail, vis-d-vis FDA
Federal regulations. Second, medical-scientific experts would need to
go through the manufacturer's extensive internal records for testing and
213 See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 206, at 1151 (explaining that the opinions of
experts play the major role in this form of causality assessment).
214 See generally Neil Vidmar & Shari Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK L. REv. 1121 (2001); Brewer, supra note 202; Joseph Sanders, Scientifically
Complex Cases, Trial By Jury, and the Erosion ofAdversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL
L. REv. 355 (1998); SHIELA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 4 (1995).
215 For discussions on the FDA Regulatory compliance defense, see generally
Robert Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J.
2049, 2054-61 (2000); Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical
Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24
SETON HALL L. REv. 1437 (1994).
216 PARKMAN & HARDEGREE, supra note 25, at 1138.
217 Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
218 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 177.
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handling of the product, which includes complex scientific techniques,
esoteric formulas, mathematical figures, and computations (which are
sometimes hand-written illegibly), and then pinpoint exactly where
such misrepresentation was done. Finally, all of these must be
explained to a jury.
III. THE ROLE OF THE FDA AND GOVERNMENT HEALTH
AGENCIES IN THE SV40 CONTROVERSY
The United States government has shown the greatest concern
for the protection and safety of its citizens from unsafe products.
Everything from common food ingredients to complex medical drugs
and devices are subject to FDA regulation and testing for safety. 2 19
Stringent FDA regulatory control over the approval and distribution of
prescription drugs is more elaborate and extensive over any other class
of products in society. 220 Its enviable standards for drug safety
outshine any regulatory agency in the world.221
A. FDA Stringency
The Reporters vividly present a picture of the intricate
procedures and tests involved in FDA prescription drug approval,222
from the conduct of human clinical trials (which take place in three
phases and usually take at least five years to complete) 223 to filing of a
New Drug Application (NDA). At any stage in testing, the FDA may
require additional studies before the manufacturer can proceed with
further clinical trials.224 The Investigational New Drug (IND) process
alone takes, on the average, twelve years, and costs more than $200
million to develop and obtain approval for a new drug. 225 NDA
219 See generally, Rachel Ochs, Pharmaceuticals: The Battle for Control in the 21st
Century, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 297 (1996); see also Food & Drug Admin. Homepage,
http://www.fda.gov (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
220 Id., See also J. Richard Crout, The Drug Regulatory System: Reflections and
Predictions, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 106, 113 (1981).221 See Ochs supra note 219 at 330 (arguing that research quality would improve if
other countries harmonize drug standards to those of the FDA).
222 Henderson & Twerski supra note 8, at 162-67.
223 Id. at 165.
224 Id.
225 Henderson & Twerski supra note 8, at 165; see also Michael D. Green, Statutory
Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 461, 486 (1997) [hereinafter Green, Statutory Compliance].
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applications can only be submitted to the FDA once the previous IND
testing stage is completed and most drugs subjected to human clinical
226trials never even reach NDA processing. NDA reports typically
consist of a hundred thousand pages or more. 227  Michael Green
observes, "the NDA for Prozac consisted of a million pages that
included reports on twenty-five pre-marketing studies of the drug.
228
Indeed, in light of the FDA's superior-performance level, courts
cannot replicate stringent agency procedures and the Reporters are
well-positioned in their argument that: "Trials are compressed in time
and scope; they do not allow for the expansive multi-year analysis and
interaction between the manufacturer and the FDA that characterize the
American drug regulatory process."
229
B. FDA Regulation is not as Fail-safe as Publicly Perceived
Nonetheless, the FDA is not as fail-safe as the public perceives
it to be 23 especially in the area of vaccines. This is so for three main
reasons: first, most of the ill-effects of a vaccine occur post-sale;
second, FDA relies on manufacturer expertise; and third, FDA relies on
science and scientists' expertise.
1. FDA Regulation is Limited Where Most Effects of Vaccines
Occur Post-Sale
Compliance with FDA stringent regulations has been given
231
appropriate weight by courts. Yet, a higher standard of safety is
expected of vaccines because in contrast to most prescription products,
which are prescribed to sick people for therapeutic purposes, vaccines
are administered to healthy people to prevent disease.232 Massive
populations of children and adults are exposed to vaccines, usually on a
226 Henderson & Twerski supra note 8, at 165-66.
227 Green, Statutory Compliance, supra note 225, at 487.
228 Id.
229 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at 166.
230 See e.g., Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products, supra note 13; Michael
Green, Safety As an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: the Respective Roles of
Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 163 (1998); see also infra notes 229-
45 and accompanying text.
231 Shwartz, Prescription Products, supra note 13, at 1377 (citing Thomas v.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949
F.2d 806, 816 (5th Cir. 1992).
232 CHEN, supra note 206, at 1145.
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compulsory basis, in order to conform with government public health
policies.
233
In this scenario, FDA regulation is especially limited in the area
of vaccine safety because much of the ill-effects of a vaccine-as
opposed to prescription drugs-occur post-sale and may take years. In
contrast to prescription drugs where safety and efficacy studies are
generally completed before the drug is licensed, evaluation of vaccine
safety is critical post-marketing. 234 Rare reactions, reactions with
delayed onset, or reactions in sub-populations may not be detected
before vaccines are licensed.235 According to Susan Ellenberg, Ph.D.,
director of the division of Biostatistics and Epidemiology of the Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), an office within the
FDA responsible for regulating vaccines, "We obviously can't get all
the information pre-marketing... You're never going to be able to do
studies big enough to detect risks that might happen at a level of one in
100,000 or one in 1 million... Still, such risks are important to detect
because of the large population exposed...,,236
2. FDA Relies on Manufacturer Expertise
a. FDA Relies on Manufacturer Test Results
Although the FDA is mandated to function as a gatekeeper, the
agency does not usually carry out the actual testing of the product 237
but is mainly dependent on tests results as reported by the
manufacturer. 38 To a manufacturer who wants to initiate the
development of a new drug, the FDA only responds to the




236 Isadora Stehlin, How FDA Works to Ensure Vaccine Safety, FDA CONSUMER
MAG., Dec. 1995, available at http://www.fda.gov./fdac/features/095 vacc.html.
237 See Rabin, supra note 215, at 2069 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(1) (1994 & Supp.
III 1997)).
238 Id. The FDA process is generally noninvasive; the FDA does not usually conduct
the actual testing, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to produce the evidence
in support of its drug or vaccine application. Id.
239 NORMAN BAYLOR AND KAREN MIDTHUN, Regulation and Testing of Vaccines, in
VACCINES, 1545 (Stanley A. Plotkin & Walter Orenstein eds., Saunders Co. 4th ed.
2004) [hereinafter VACCINES, 4th ed.] (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2002) (explaining that
the clinical development of a new drug usually begins with a sponsor approaching the
FDA to conduct a clinical study with an investigational product through submission
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With respect to vaccines, the Code of Federal Regulations
mandates the tests that manufacturers must perform on each lot of
vaccine. The manufacturers then send out the lot samples, along with
the results of their tests to the FDA.2 40 The FDA may or may not
choose to do the testing themselves. According to Jerome A. Donlon,
M.D., Ph.D., director of CBER, "We either test the lot sample
ourselves or go with the manufacturer's documentation."' 24 1 With
regard to adverse events, the FDA relies on a passive system that
depends on a voluntary reporting of adverse events by the healthcare
community.
b. FDA Relies on the Manufacturer's Scientific Research
Publications About the Product
Dr. Marcia Angell explains:
When a drug company applies to the FDA for approval of a
new drug, it is required to submit results from every one of
the clinical trials it has sponsored. But it is not required to
publish them. The FDA may approve the drug on the basis
of minimal evidence. For example, the agency usually
requires simply that the drug work better than a placebo in
two clinical trials, even if it doesn't in other trials. But
companies publish only the positive results, not the
negative ones. Often, in fact, they publish positive results
more than once, in slightly different forms in different
journals. The FDA has no control over this selective
publishing. The practice leads doctors to believe that drugs
are much better than they are, and the public comes to share
this belief, on the basis of media reports.242
of an IND application form. In this application, the sponsor describes the vaccine, its
method of manufacture, a description of the proposed clinical study and the names
and qualifications of each clinical investigator, and the quality control tests for
release).
240 21 C.F.R. § 630.19 (c) (1996)
241 Stehlin, supra note 236.
242 ANGELL, supra note 117, at 112. Dr. Marcia Angell is former editor in chief of the
New England Journal of Medicine and a member of Harvard Medical School's
Department of Social Medicine.
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In addition, some manufacturers fail to adequately inform the FDA of
emerging problems.243 Despite legally mandated reporting of adverse
events, estimates still show significant under-reporting to the FDA.244
3. FDA Relies on Science and the Scientist
One crucial fact must be emphasized. The FDA relies on
science and the scientist.
Because of the heavy burden on the FDA to make decisions that
affect public health, FDA decisions are based on the highest standards
of science: "[T]he agency's use of science covers disciplines as diverse
as molecular biology and clinical pharmacology, nuclear physics and
electrical engineering, clinical trials methodology, and the arcane of
statistical analysis of surveillance databases . . . FDA's scientists
wrestle with cutting-edge concepts in a cosmos of constantly changing
scientific advancement... The consequences may be nothing less than
life and death., 245 Bernard A. Schwetz affirms: "[S]cience has always
been the foundation for FDA decisions, and maintaining a high quality
scientific infrastructure is an ongoing challenge-one that requires
continual support, resources, and attention....
a. Cutting-Edge Science: Rigorous Peer Review
To achieve and maintain the highest standards of science,
science at FDA must be as accurate and as "cutting edge" as possible.
The field of science is characterized by the most meticulous
deliberative process-impressions, ideas, and interpretations,
hypotheses, and theories. All must be tested within the realms of
rigorous observation, experimentation, and argument. Premature
243 See, e.g., Ochs, supra note 216, at 297.
244 See, e.g., Michael Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (and Seen):
Contemporary Lawmaking in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 377 (1999-
2000) [hereinafter Green, Road Less Well Traveled]; see also MICHAEL D. GREEN,
BENEDICTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS ToxIc SUBSTANCES
LITIGATION 128-29 (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENEDICTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF
MASS TORT LITIGATION 8-9 (1998).
245 Larry Thompson, Science at FDA: the Key to Making the Right Decision,
FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, March-April 2000, available at
http://www.fda.gov./fdac/features/2000/200 sci.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2002)
[hereinafter Science at FDA].
246 Bernard Schwetz, Remarks of the Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner of
Food and Drugs, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 123 (2001).
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scientific generalizations unsubstantiated by adequate data will be set
aside by consensus until assumptions are replaced with fact. 247
Scientific foundation of the highest standards of quality is "cutting-
edge science"-a discipline of complexity, contradictions and dualities.
In face of uncertainty, FDA-science has developed a system of
extensive consultation or peer review. Peer review is a tradition
wherein scientific experts, at the forefront of their fields, sit in
judgment of scientific data. At professional scientific meetings and
conferences, scientists will debate over the meaning of a result, the
appropriateness of a scientific method employed to arrive at a result, or
the interpretation of a result. The accepted conclusion is based on the
dominant caliber of the argument, the data and consensus among expert
peers.
24 8
b. Cutting-edge Science: The Backbone of Inter-government
Health Agencies' Decision-making
Within the FDA is the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research (CBER)249 responsible for regulating vaccine products. In
addition to its own internal staff of physicians and scientists, the CBER
mediates a continued exchange of information with the outside
scientific community through advisory committees. Advisory
committees consist of individuals outside the government, who are
academic experts in various medical-scientific fields (i.e., vaccines,
microbiology, infectious diseases, immunology and clinical studies
review), industry leaders, and consumer and patient representatives.
These individuals review data and issues associated with products
(from safety and efficacy studies to developing recommendations for
use in the product's package insert) and recommend what action the
FDA should take.25 °
Aside from advisory committees, the FDA collaborates or
establishes partnerships with other government health agencies. The
FDA works closely with its counterparts in other government agencies
such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the
247 Id.
248 Larry Thompson, Science at FDA: the Key to Making the Right Decision, FDA
CONSUMER MAG., Mar.-Apr. 2000, available at
http://www.fda.gov./fdac/features/2000/200_sci.html.
249 See Food & Drug Admin. - Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Res. - Vaccines,
http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaccines.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
250 See, e.g., Stehlin, supra note 236.
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National Institutes of Health (NIH). 251 The CDC is responsible for
epidemiological surveillance of disease and for support of
immunization programs. 252 The National Cancer Institute (NCI), 253 a
subsidiary of the NIH, is responsible for conducting and funding
biomedical research related to cancer.
C. The FDA-Inter-Government (NCI/CDC) Stand on the SV40
Controversy
In 2001, while Dr. Carbone and more than forty other
laboratories around the world have detected the presence of SV40 in
human cancer tissues,254 and government agencies like the NIH, the
FDA and the CDC, are all aware of the possible link between cancer
and the polio vaccine, 255 still, at the NIH-NCI, (Viral Epidemiology
Branch), scientists were still preoccupied with determining whether the
virus is even present in human tumors.
256
As far as scientific research is concerned, Dr. Carbone's results,
together with results of multiple laboratories around the world,
regarding SV40 and its role in producing human cancer, are still
undergoing heavy peer review and vigorous scientific debate in
national and international fora.2 57 Because current scientific debate
reflects the uncertainty of whether SV40 is cancer-producing or not, the
FDA, together with other government agencies like the NIH or the
CDC who rely heavily on science for decision-making, assert that
further research into the field of SV40 is needed.258
251 See Nat'l Institutes of Health - About the Nat'l Institutes of Health (NIH),
http://www.nih.gov/about, (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
252 See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention - About CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/aboutcdc.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2007); see also PARKMAN &
HARDEGREE, supra note 25, at 1131.
253 See Nat'l Cancer Inst., http://www.cancer.gov (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
254 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 75; see also Donald Maclachlan, SV40
in Human Tumors: New Documents Shed Light on the Apparent Controversy, 22
ANTICANCER REs. 3495 (2002).
255 See supra notes 32-67, 249-251 and accompanying text.
256 See Bookchin & Schumcher, supra note 36, at 71-74.
257 See, e.g., Maclachlan, supra note 254, at 3495, 3495 n.3 (citing a July
11,2002 meeting of the Immunization Safety Review Committee, Institute of
Medicine entitled "SV40 Contamination of Polio Vaccine and Cancer").
258 See CDC-NIP Concerns, supra note 40 (explaining, "At a glance: SV40 has been
found in certain types of human cancers . . . however, some research results are
conflicting and more studies are needed").
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D. The Bottom Line
The FDA relies heavily on medical scientists and the results of
their research work. Collaborations between the FDA and respected
science institutions in government like the CDC and NIH all rely on
rigorous peer-reviewed scientific research. It is precisely because of
such scientific and medical expertise that the public trusts the FDA
with decisions that affect the lives of the American public. The
medical-scientific community realizes that high standards of accuracy
are necessary in reviewing SV40-related scientific studies and
experiments because should authorities decide to withdraw a vaccine or
switch strains, results on public health may have wide ramifications.
25 9
However, what happens if scientific work upon which the FDA and
other government health agencies rely on is fraudulent, falsified, based
on flawed processes or defective?
IV. THE ROLE OF THE SCIENTIST AND SCIENTIFIC
MISCONDUCT IN THE CONTROVERSY
The world of medical science is one of the most exciting and
successful ventures of mankind. Scientists have achieved a high level
of respect, and their dazzling contributions to human progress are more
dynamic than ever. Extraordinary and unpredictable discoveries have
relieved humanity of suffering and have saved lives. Precisely because
of the confidence and respect placed in scientists that accounts of
scientific misconduct 26 are deeply disturbing.
259 See CHEN, supra note 206, at 1145-46 (explaining that establishing associations
between vaccines and attributable risk requires meticulous assurance in order to place
adverse events in the proper risk-benefit perspective). An erroneous association can
undermine public confidence in a vaccine and have disastrous consequences when
disease epidemics break out. Id. For instance, in 1992, Britain withdrew the license
of the mumps vaccine containing the Urabe strain when scientific studies indicated a
high rate of vaccine-associated meningitis. Id. Manufacturers then withdrew this
product worldwide. Id. Consequently, in countries where the Urabe strain had been
the sole mumps vaccine licensed, they were left with no other alternative. Id.
260 See generally Robert M. Anderson, The Federal Government's Role in Regulating
Misconduct in Scientific and Technological Research, 3 J.L.TECH 121, 147 (1988).
The National Science Foundation (NSF), a federal agency responsible for funding
basic science research, promulgated a set of rules governing misconduct which occurs
in research projects funded by Foundation grants. Id. NSF established the following
standards for actionable misconduct:
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Scientific misconduct is not an isolated phenomenon. 261
Several scientists throughout history have been scrutinized in modem
times because of suspicions that some of those achievements may have
been obtained through less than honest means. 2 62
The following examples illustrate the elusive problem of
scientific misconduct and how internal controls expose it after it occurs.
A. Accounts of Scientific Misconduct
1. Dr. John Darsee
One scandalous incidence of misconduct involved Dr. John
Darsee, a cardiovascular researcher who worked as an instructor at the
Harvard Medical School and as a fellow at the National Institutes of
Health (NIH). Dr. Darsee was caught fabricating raw data for a
study.263 He was then dismissed from the faculty and the fellowship
but was allowed to remain as a researcher. Subsequent research data
collected by Dr. Darsee were questioned, which lead to investigations
conducted by Harvard and by the NIH. The investigation at Harvard
revealed various irregularities in Darsee's results. Furthermore, a later
investigation by Emory revealed that only two of the ten papers and
only two of forty-five abstracts published by Darsee at Emory were
valid.264 Peculiar to Dr. Darsee's studies was the reported collaboration
Misconduct means (1) fabrication, falsification, plagiarism or other serious
deviation from accepted practices in proposing, carrying out, or reporting
results from research; (2) material failure to comply with federal
requirements for protection of researchers, human subjects, or the public or
for ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals; or (3) failure to meet other
material legal requirements governing research. Id.
261 See generally WILLIAM BROAD & NICHOLAS WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE
TRUTH (1983); ALEXANDER KOHN, FALSE PROPHETS (1986); see also Susan Kuzma,
Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific Research, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
357, 421 (1992); Jennifer Kulynych, Intent to Deceive: Mental State and Scienter in
the New Uniform Federal Definition of Scientific Misconduct, STAN. TECH. L. REv.
1-118 (1998).
262 Kuzma, supra note 261. Some well known scientists believed to be involved
in scientific misconduct include Ptolemy, Galileo & Newton. Id. at 358-59.263 See BROAD & WADE, supra note 261, at 13-15; KOHN, supra note 261, at 84-
88; see also Kuzma, supra note 261, at 360.
264 KOHN, supra note 261, at 87.
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of three other researchers whose existence the investigating committees
were unable to validate.265
2. Dr. William Summerlin
Equally infamous was the case of Dr. William Summerlin,266 a
dermatologist and researcher at the Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer
Research in New York, who demonstrated a novel method for
preventing tissue graft rejection. His scientific accomplishments would
have been significant because his method would solve a main problem
267in transplant surgery. Unfortunately, scientists, including his own
research workers, could not duplicate Dr. Summerlin's research
findings. To quell skepticisms about Dr. Summerlin's research work,
Dr. Robert A. Good, head of the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Institute,
assembled a conference to discuss Dr. Summerlin's research findings.
At the conference, Dr. Summerlin presented white mice bearing dark
patches of skin that were obtained by transplanting tissue from dark
mice that differ genetically from the white mice. Dr. Good was
satisfied with the outcome of the conference. However, a laboratory
technician discovered that the dark patches on a white mouse
disappeared with the application of alcohol. When confronted with this
issue, Dr. Summerlin confessed that he used a felt tip pen to darken the
area on the animal.268 He was then terminated from the institution.
3. Dr. Hwang Woo-Suk
In December 2005, the international scientific community was
shocked with controversy regarding the questionable research on stem
cells conducted by South Korean cloning expert Hwang Woo-Suk
2 6 9
published in the prestigious U.S. journal Science. Investigation showed
that Hwang had deliberately faked his data.270 The news has been a big
265 Id.
266 Kuzma, supra note 261, at 360-62.
267 id.
268 Id.; BROAD & WADE, supra note 261, at 155.
269 In 2004, Dr. Hwang Woo-Suk was named by Time magazine as one of "People
Who Mattered in 2004." See Time Magazine: People Who Mattered 2004: Dr.
Hwang Woo Suk, http://www.time.com/
time/asia/2004/personoftheyear/people/hwang-woo suk.html, (last visited Feb. 2,
2007).
270 See, e.g., B.J. Lee, Storm Over Stem Cells, NEWSWEEK INT'L EDITION, Jan. 9,
2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 10682397/site/newsweek.
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disappointment to the scientific world which had viewed his
achievements as showing great promise for treating a variety of
271diseases from spinal cord injuries to Parkinson's disease.
B. Effects of Scientific Misconduct
Fraudulent scientific research wastes taxpayer's money, grant
money and public resources. 272 Falsified scientific data can lead to
misdirected future funding for unnecessary research studies. 273
Humanity suffers when false data form the basis of federal decision-
making and public policies which affect human life. The following
examples illustrate this:
1. IBT Laboratories
In the 1970s, charges were filed against officers of Industrial
Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc. of Northbrook, Illinois.274 IBT performed
contract research on a variety of products such as drugs and pesticides
to determine animal toxicity levels of these products. Data provided
by IBT on these products were submitted to regulatory agencies so
that the agencies could determine whether these products were
effective, safe and non-hazardous to humans.
In the mid-1970s, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
raised concerns about IBT's research results. Criminal charges were
brought against IBT's three head officers, who were subsequently
convicted of violating the false statement statute and the mail fraud
statute. Scientific misconduct involved failure to disclose information
and false reporting or underreporting of data to the FDA.
The damage caused by IBT's fraudulent data was significant
because many governmental decisions were formed based on them.
Thousands of IBT research studies had to be re-evaluated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).275 In 1986, EPA issued an
emergency declaration to ban dinoseb, a chemical marketed by IBT.
According to IBT's data report, it was proven to be safe.276 However,
271 Id.
272 Kulynych, supra note 261, at 32.
273 Kuzma, supra note 261, at 398.
274 Id. at 376-80 (citing United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
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when other agencies performed safety tests, dinoseb was shown to be
hazardous to humans.
2. National Genome Research Institute
Fabricated data at the National Human Genome Research
Institute (NHGRI)278 came to light in April 1996, when a peer
reviewer for the journal Oncogene analyzed the data in a paper co-
authored by NHGRI director Dr. Francis Collins. The reviewer
contacted Collins about the data. On internal investigation, Collins
learned that over the course of several years, his graduate student had
fabricated control data for several of the experiments. During this
same period Collins and his other laboratory scientists had unwittingly
published the invalid data in a series of important papers on the
genetics of leukemia.
279
C. The On-going Controversy among Scientists in the Frontier
of SV40 Research
While close to fifty major laboratories world-wide have
published literature on the presence of SV40 in various types of
human cancer, 280 one study that has been highly influential in
direction of scientific research and government response to the SV40
controversy is the publication by a prominent epidemiologist, Howard
Strickler.28 1
In 1996, Strickler published a study together with Dr. Keerti
Shah, of the Johns Hopkins University, School of Hygiene and Public
Health. Strickler and Shah reported that they did not find SV40 virus
in their mesothelioma tumor samples.282
In 1997, the International Mesothelioma Interest Group set out
to study if SV40 was present in human mesothelioma tissues.283 The
277 Id.
278 See generally, Kulynych, supra note 261, at 1-4.
279 Id. at 2, n.4 (explaining that Dr. Collins publicly acknowledged the fraud and
decided to retract two of the published papers and correct three others); see also Eliot
Marshall, Fraud Strikes Top Genome Lab, 274 SCIENCE 908 (1996).
280 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text; see also Maclachlan, supra note
254.
281 See Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 71-72.
282 H.D. Strickler et al., Simian Virus 40 and Pleural Mesothelioma in Humans, 5
CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 473-75 (1996).
283 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 72.
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organization contacted internationally renowned molecular geneticist,
Dr. Joseph Testa, the director of the Human Genetics Program at the
Fox Chase Cancer Center in Philadelphia to oversee the study.284
Testa, who specialized in mesothelioma research, initially doubted
that SV40 could be found in human mesotheliomas, because he
believed that asbestos was the cause of the disease. However, results
of his 1998 study changed his mind. SV40 was present in at least nine
out of the twelve human mesothelioma tissues.285
Strickler questioned Testa's conclusions because "the
prevalence [of SV40-positive samples] were so high ... that you have
no way to make the distinction between [contamination] and a true
positive result."
286
In 2001, another multi-center study was again spearheaded by
Dr. Howard Strickler and Dr. Shah. The study produced irregular
results and concluded that, "further studies are needed to reconcile
these results with previous reports of detection of SV40 DNA in
tumor specimens. 287
The studies by Dr. Strickler & Dr. Shah are cited again and
again by federal health agencies to question whether SV40 is really
present in human tumors, 288 and that the dozens of peer-reviewed
research spearheaded by Carbone, documenting the presence of SV40
in human cancer, remain equivocal and unpersuasive. 2 89  Several
scientists however, have criticized Strickler and Shah's work, saying
that they treated the cancer samples in a way that would not result in
efficient extraction of SV40 DNA. 290 Inefficient extraction of SV40
DNA will yield results that will not show the presence of SV40 in
cancer samples.291
284 Id.
285 Id. See Joseph R. Testa et al., A Multi-Institutional Study Confirms the Presence
and Expression of Simian Virus 40 in Human Malignant Mesotheliomas, 58 CANCER
REs. 4505, 4509 (1998).
286 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 72.
287 Howard Strickler et al., A Multicenter Evaluation of Assays for Detection of SV40
DNA and Results in Masked Mesothelioma Specimens, 10 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 523-32, 2001.
288 See, e.g., Nat'l Cancer Inst., Simian Virus 40 and Human Cancer: Fact Sheet,
http://www.cancer.gov/newscenter/sv40 (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
289 Bookchin & Schumacher, supra note 36, at 71-72.
290 Id. at 72. See also Maclachlan, supra note 254, at 3495-99; MARC RAMEL, Causes
and Prevention of Technical Artifacts When Studying Simian Virus 40 (SV40) in
Human Mesotheliomas, in MALIGNANT MESOTHELIOMA, supra note 60, at 316-
319.291 See supra notes 291-292; infra note 296 and accompanying text.
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D. Concerns of Scientific Misconduct at the Mesothelioma Meeting
2001
At the April 2001 Mesothelioma Conference in Chicago,292 Dr.
Shah was queried by a member of the scientific audience, "Which
method did you follow for the DNA extraction? The Chomcynski
method or the Chirgwin method?, 293 Dr. Shah replied, "Proteinase
K-it's a crude method."
1. On using a "crude method" for DNA extraction
The DNA extraction method is the most crucial step for
molecular detection of SV40.294 It is the first and most important step
in DNA analysis. Every succeeding step of DNA analysis to detect the
presence of SV40 will rely on the DNA extraction method. It is
necessary to perform the DNA extraction with utmost precision and
accuracy, using the most scientifically-advanced and appropriate
technique. Application of an inefficient or "crude" method to extract
DNA will result in degraded DNA. If DNA is already degraded in the
first step, the presence of SV40 will not be detected in any of the
succeeding steps.
2. On the Relationship between the Scientist and the
Pharmaceutical Industry
In scientific research, the pressure is intense-faculty
advancement, recognition by peers, the need to publish the need to
constantly do novel cutting-edge scientific work. 295 Scientific
breakthrough in a fiercely competitive intellectual arena demands large
investments of time, human resources, and money. An economic
powerhouse-like a pharmaceutical manufacturer-can make a
292 Nat'l Conference, Malignant Mesothelioma - Therapeutic Options and the Role of
SV40: An Update, University of Chi., Chi. Ill., Apr. 20-21, 2001. The authors were
present at this conference.
293 Id.
294 BHARAT JASANI & KATIE Ross, Molecular Detection of Simian Virus 40 in
Human Mesothelioma; in MALIGNANT MESOTHELIOMA, supra note 60, at 331-345.
295 Hamilton Moses, III & Joseph Martin, Academic Relationships with Industry: A
New Model for Biomedical Research 285 JAMA 933-35 (2001); see also D. Kom,
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research. 284 JAMA 2234-37 (2000).
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scientist's dreams a reality. Almost inevitably, ubiquitous financial
relationships may develop between industry sponsors and the
investigators who perform laboratory or clinical research on their
behalf.
296
Dr. Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, summarizes this relationship:
[T]he ties between clinical researchers and industry include
not only grant support, but also a host of other financial
arrangements. Researchers serve as consultants to
companies whose products they are studying, join advisory
boards and speakers' bureaus, enter into patent and royalty
arrangements, agree to be the listed authors of articles
ghostwritten by interested companies, promote drugs and
devices at company-sponsored symposiums, and allow
themselves to be plied with expensive gifts and trips to
luxurious settings. Many also have equity interest in the
297
companies....
Thus, because of need, researchers might undertake studies on
the basis of whether they can get industry funding, not whether the
studies are scientifically important. 298 Of greater concern is the
possibility that financial ties may influence the outcome of scientific
research.299 The sponsoring company may control the data and decides
whether to publish or not and what to publish.3 °0 Sometimes, the final
version of the publication may not even state its origins. 30 1
296 Korn, supra note 295 at 2234.
297 Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1516
(2000).
29 8 Id. at 1516-17.
299Id. at 1517-18.
300 Id. See also G Levy, Publication Bias: Its Implications for Clinical
Pharmacology, 52 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS. 115-19 (1992);
Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539-44 (2000).
301 See Bodenheimer supra note 297at 1541-43 (discussing how sponsoring
companies have wide discretion over the publication of final results).
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E. How is Scientific Misconduct Corrected in the Scientific
Community?
Many believe that the science community possesses various
internal mechanisms to correct scientific misconduct among its
members without interventions from the outside world. 302 These
mechanisms for detecting scientific misconduct include replication of
experimental work, peer review of proposals for funding and peer
review of scientific articles before publication.3 °3 Although in theory
these mechanisms function quite adequately, in reality, these
mechanisms can fail to detect scientific misconduct. Scientists do not
generally replicate experiments because they are more concerned to
publish new, innovative research.30 4
Additionally, the peer review process at the agency funding
level cannot detect all data anomalies submitted to them.30 5 Finally,
scientists serving as peer reviewers for scientific journals do not check
all references because of time constraints or simply because they are
disinterested in the submitted article.
30 6
Scientists do not like controversies, like scientific misconduct
among colleagues, to be made public. They fear exclusion by the
scientific community on which they so heavily rely on for peer review.
Furthermore, scientists are afraid to question their colleagues work by
replicating their work or whistle blowing, because they are fearful that
their careers could be damaged.30 7
As of this writing, the authors do not know how much progress
has been generated in terms of SV40 research after Dr. Shah's
admission of using a "crude method" in his world-influential study.
The authors are only aware that there still exists an ongoing debate
regarding this issue. 30
8





30' Andersen, supra note 260; see also Kuzma, supra note 261, at 291.
308 See generally, Maclachlan, supra note 252; See also Keerti V. Shah, SV40 and
Human Cancer: A Review of Recent Data, 120 INT. J. CANCER 215-223 (2007);
MARC RAMAEL, Causes and Prevention of Technical Artifacts When Studying Simian
Virus 40 (SV40) in Human Mesotheliomas, in MALIGNANT MESOTHELIOMA, supra
note 60, at 316-319; A. Elmishad, M. Bocchtta, et.al., Polio Vaccines, SV40 and
Human Tumours, An Update on False Positive and False Negative Results, 123
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V. A SYSTEM OF TRIANGULATION:
THE SCIENTIST-THE FDA/GOVERNMENT-THE
MANUFACTURER
Science, the FDA-government, and the therapeutic industry-
these are three of the most powerful partner institutions in modem life.
Cooperative growth and interdependence among each other has
propelled the pace of American economic development, and has been
instrumental in the rise of America as a leader and a political super-
world power.
Ironically, however, in select circumstances when conflict of
interest occurs in a powerful system, the same cooperative growth can
create a system of triangulation, one that disregards public interest.
A System of Triangulation: The FDA-government,
Manufacturer, Scientist
A. Conflict of Interest in Vaccine Policy-making: An Example of
a System of Triangulation
To illustrate the dynamics of the system of triangulation at
work, conflict of interest among powerful players that comprise the
triangle (science, industry and FDA-government) has generated a
serious issue uncovered in vaccine policy-making. 30 9
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 109-17 (2006) (explaining that difference in the
sensitivities of methodologies can lead to different interpretation of the same study).
309 See generally, Michael Horwin, Ensuring Safe, Effective and Necessary Vaccines
for Children, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 321 (2001).
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Great concern is generated by the fact that many of the doctors
and scientists who sit on federal advisory committees and influence
national vaccine policy are the same individuals who may enjoy
financial connections with vaccine manufacturers. For instance,
RotaShield vaccine, manufactured by Wyeth-Lederle was designed to
protect against the "rotavirus," which causes diarrhea in children.
310
The FDA approved the vaccine in August 1998 and was distributed in
October 1998. Seven months later, cases of intussusception, a life-
threatening anatomical defect, were reported,311 leading to at least one
death. 312  Wyeth-Lederle halted distribution of the vaccine in July
1999 and withdrew it from the market in October of the same year.
3 13
Based on congressional investigation, clinical trials of
RotaShield prior to FDA approval showed significant rates of
intussusception in children. 314  The large number of injuries and
potential deaths outweighed whatever benefit the vaccine would
provide in preventing diarrhea. 315 Although advisory committees were
aware of this data, they voted unanimously to approve the vaccine.
3 16
The House of Representatives Committee on Government
Reform began an investigation in August 1999 regarding the approval
of RotaShield vaccine. 317 The committee issued a report which
highlighted the role of two influential bodies that help define U.S.
vaccine policy: (1) the FDA's Vaccines and Related Biological
Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC); and (2) the CDC's
318Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).





314 Horwin, supra note 309, at 323 n. 29 (citing MAJORITY STAFF OF THE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REP., 106TH CONG., CONFLICTS OF INTEREST




318 The ACIP provides advice to the Secretary, Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the Assistant Secretary for Health, and the CDC Director regarding
the safety and use of vaccines. Id.
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1. FDA's Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory
Committee (VRBPAC)
The House of Representatives Committee on Government
Reform conducted an investigation on the member doctors of the
VRBPAC. 319 The investigation revealed intriguing conflicts of interest
among its members. Members owned stock in vaccine companies,
helped in licensing the vaccine to RotaShield's manufacturer, or
received hundreds of thousands of dollars in grants from Wyeth-
Lederle. The committee concluded: "The overwhelming majority of
members, both voting members and consultants have substantial ties to
the pharmaceutical industry." 3
20
Furthermore, the report disclosed that the same members sat on
the committee for many years despite term limits. Four of the five who
voted for RotaShield required waivers for conflict of interest and other
conflicts of interest were allowed without a waiver.
2. CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
Between February 1998 and June 1999, eight separate votes
were held by the CDC's ACIP. 321 The Congressional Investigation
found that the ACIP "recommended the RotaShield for universal use
before it was even approved by the FDA. 322 The report revealed that a
blanket waiver was granted to members regardless of conflicts of
interest for up to a year and ACIP members voted on vaccine
recommendations despite having financial ties to pharmaceuticals that
develop related vaccines.323 Moreover, some ACIP members did not
fully disclose their conflicts of interest and contrary to the rules, some
ACIP members were found to participate in both the FDA and ACIP
advisory committees.
Like the FDA committee members, significant financial ties
between CDC advisory members and vaccine manufacturers exist:
owning the patent on a similar rotavirus vaccine; receiving grants and
consulting fees from the manufacturer; and owning thousands of dollars
worth of stocks in vaccine companies.
319 Horwin, supra note 309, at 340-41.
320 Id. (citing MAJORITY STAFF REPORT).
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In a August 10, 2000 letter to Donna Shalala, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Congressman Dan Burton, chairman of
the Committee for Government Reform stated: "It has become clear
over the course of this investigation that the VRBPAC and the ACIP
are dominated by individuals with close working relationships with the
vaccine producers..." 324 Congressman Burton suggested several
recommendations to tighten the current law which include stricter
standards to identify conflicts of interest in areas such as stock
ownership, halting the issuance of annual conflict of interest waivers by
the CDC and disallowing members with conflicts of interest from
participating in drafting vaccine recommendations.
However, on November 16, 2000, Ms. Melinda K. Plaisier,
Associate Commissioner for Legislation for the Department of Health
and Human Services responded and explained that the FDA has the
authority to allow the participation of individuals with conflicts of
interest in vaccine committees because they are "the most active
researchers" and the need "for their expertise outweighs the conflict of
interest.'
325
B. The Dynamics of a System of Triangulation
1. The FDA- Scientist Relationship
The scientist and his work form the backbone of FDA
decisions. To provide the critical science base, the FDA has over 900
outside experts who are highly specialized in specific scientific areas
many of whom serve in FDA advisory committees. 326 As such, these
same people are often sought out by industry to develop prescription
drugs and vaccines. Frequently, they have research grants from and
contracts within industry.
A 2003 piece of investigative reporting by David Willman in
the Los Angeles Times, called that picture into serious question. 328
324 Horwin, supra note 309, at 351 (citing Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman of the
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives (Aug. 10, 2000)).
325 Id.
326 Food and Drug Admin., Policies and Procedures for Handling Conflicts of Interest
with FDA Advisory Committee Members, Consultants and Experts,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisor/conflictof interest/policies.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2007).
327 id.
328 David Willman, StealthMerger: Drug Companies and Government Medical
Research, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at Al.
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Willman reported that senior scientists (who are among the highest paid
employees in government) usually supplement their income by
accepting large consulting fees and stock options from drug companies
that have dealings with the institutes.
For instance, according to Willman, senior scientists with
financial ties to industry included the director of the National Institute
of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Disease, the director of the
NIH Clinical Center (the main area for human trials research), and the
former director of the National Human Genome Research Institute.
Willman found out that some NIH scientists made hundreds of
thousands of dollars in consulting fees.
Dr. Marcia Angell, former editor in chief of the New England
Journal of Medicine and a member of Harvard Medical School's
Department of Social Medicine reiterates:
It is impossible to know to what extent these financial deals
influenced NIH judgments about grants, research priorities,
or the interpretation of results, but they certainly are a
cause for concern. Outside activities were said to be
approved by supervisors, and scientists supposedly excused
themselves from direct involvement in decisions that
affected their outside clients, but Willman reported
instances in which even those minimal restrictions seem to
have been ignored. Moreover, the NIH did not even
require most senior scientists to file public disclosures of
their outside income. The result was that, as of 2003, more
than 94 percent of the agency's 2259 top scientists did not
have to reveal their outside consulting income. 329
329 ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 117, at 105.
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2. The FDA-Manufacturer Relationship
Aside from an interdependent relationship with the scientists,
the FDA establishes collaborations and partnerships with the resource-
equipped manufacturing industry. 330  The FDA acknowledges that
"[m]ost new therapies today reach the market because a private
commercial entity was willing to invest in the development and testing
process necessary to bring a product to the market." 331 As
Congressman Berkley Bedell remarks, "It costs millions and millions
of dollars to go through the FDA approval process. This freezes out
anyone except giant corporations, and makes it utterly impossible for
any low cost non-patentable medicines to get into the system."
332
The pharmaceutical industry, like any business entity, is fiercely
devoted to business. Expectedly, incentives to develop a new drug or
vaccine will be limited to those products, which industry can patent,
333
recover its costs, and transform into sales-generating engines. When
conflict of interest occurs in a symbiotic relationship between members
of those affiliated with the FDA-government and the pharmaceutical
industry, the goal of sales generation may overlook the expensive
process of guaranteeing product safety and efficacy.
330 Bernard Schwetz, Susan Homire & James Macgregor, Food and Drug
Admin., Science at the FDA: Improving the Scientific Basis of Regulation through
Collaboration with Stakeholders, Apr. 5, 1999,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oha/fdascience.htm (explaining, "The Federal Technology
Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502) encourages government/industry
collaborations on technology development and authorizes Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADA's) between government and private industry.
Although regulatory agencies must avoid conflicts of interest when collaborating with
regulated companies").
331 Michael Horwin, War on Cancer: Why Does the FDA Deny Access to
Alternative Cancer Treatments?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 189, 201 (2001) (citing
Statement of Michael A. Friedman, Lead Deputy Commissioner Food and Drug
Admin., Before the Government Reform Committee of the House of Representatives,
105th Cong. (Apr. 22, 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/ ola/therapy.htm)).
332 Id. (citing Statement of Hon. Berkley Bedell, Patient Access to Alternative
Treatments: Beyond the FDA, Hearings Before the House Government Reform
Committee, 105th Cong. (Feb 4, 1998)).
333 See, e.g., Conk, supra note 112.
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3. The Manufacturer-Scientist Relationship
a. Manufacturers Establish Partnerships with Top Scientists at
Academic Medical Centers
There is no doubt that manufacturers provide valuable support
that propels academic institutions to generate fresh talent and dazzling
discoveries in medicine. In an article entitled, Is Academic Medicine
for Sale? Dr. Marcia Angell discusses the extent to which academic
medicine has become so intertwined with pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies:
... Academic medical institutions are themselves growing
increasingly beholden to industry... Some academic
institutions have entered into partnerships with drug
companies to set up research centers and teaching programs
in which students and faculty members essentially carry out
industry research. Both sides see great benefit in this
arrangement. For financially struggling medical centers, it
means cash. For the companies that make the drugs and
devices, it means access to research talent, as well as
affiliation with a prestigious "brand.,
334
Dr. Angell cites the following as some of the academic-industrial
arrangements at Harvard University:335 Shiseido, the Japanese cosmetic
manufacturer, gave Harvard's Massachusetts General Hospital $180
million over ten years for first rights to discoveries by faculty
dermatologists. The Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, a Harvard hospital,
has an agreement which gives Novartis patent rights to discoveries that
lead to develop cancer drugs. The pharmaceutical giant Merck is
building a twelve-story research facility next door to Harvard Medical
School.
The extensive association of networks among scientific-medical
research in academe coupled with the support of industry, has become
336increasingly dense, complex and rewarding for all those concerned.
334 Angell, supra note 298, at 1516, 1518.
335 ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 117, at 101-102.
336 Hamilton Moses III MD & Joseph B. Martin, Commentary, Academic
Relationships with Industry: A New Model for Biomedical Research, 285 JAMA 934
(2001).
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Dr. Moses Hamilton asks, "How can universities police themselves
when they themselves own equity or they receive royalties?
Additionally, how can the university oversee a scientific investigator
when their interests are in parallel -- when income is both shared by the
researcher and the university?,
337
b. Most Research on Drugs is Sponsored by Industry-Concerns of
Bias Emerge
Dr. Angell relates:
I witnessed firsthand the influence of the industry on work
is sponsored by drug companies. I saw companies begin to
exercise a level of control over the way research is done
that was unheard of when I first came to the journal, and
the aim was clearly to load the dice to make sure their
drugs looked good. As an example, companies would
require researchers to compare a new drug with placebo
(sugar pill) instead of with an older drug. That way, the
new drug would look good even though it might actually
look worse than the older one. There are other ways to bias
research, and not all of them can be spotted, even by
experts. Obviously, we reject such papers when we
recognize them, but often they would turn up in other
journals. Sometimes companies don't allow researchers to
publish their results at all if they are unfavorable to the
companies' drugs. As I saw industry influence grow, I
became increasingly troubled by the possibility that much
published research is seriously flawed, leading doctors to
believe new drugs are generally more effective and safer
than they actually are.
338
She further explains,
most clinical research on drugs is sponsored by the
companies that make them. By itself, industry sponsorship
does not mean the research is biased. But in addition, drug
companies now have considerable control over the way the
337 Id.
338 ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 117, at xxvi-xxvii.
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research is carried out and reported 339 .... You might argue
that yes, the ideas for innovative drugs come from outside
the industry, but ultimately it is the industry that actually
brings drugs to the market. Universities can't put pills in
bottles and sell them... Publicly funded scientists come up
with the ideas and early development, and drug companies
put that to practical use. The companies sponsor clinical
trials, they convert the drugs to forms that can be safely and
readily administered, and they produce and distribute the
final products.
340
Companies are involved in every detail of the research-from
design of the study through analysis of the data to the decision whether
to publish the results. This involvement makes bias extremely likely,
where sponsors can control the results of the clinical trials.341
Sponsoring companies usually keep the data. In multicenter
trials, they may not even let the researchers see all of it. In addition,
they also analyze and interpret the results, and decide what, if anything,
should be published.342
Science, the therapeutic industry, and the FDA (government)-
these three entities represent great benefits to mankind. Basic
principles on which these three systems are built are uncontestedly
glorious: when the scientist conceptualizes medical innovation,
industry actualizes the development, and production of such
revolutionizing discoveries, and the FDA-government propagates
regulation and support in the distribution of the product to those who
need it.
While the pharmaceutical industry may be criticized as putting
profit before public safety, 343 this same industry has been the source of
healing for mankind. Industry's high-tech machinery, equipment, and
other logistics have made possible the development and mass
production of wonder drugs such as penicillin or chemotherapeutic
drugs that prolong the lives of the sick. However, when conflicts of
interest infiltrate the powerful system of alliance and
interdependence-of which the drug industry is the main economic
powerhouse-the web of complexity forms a triangle, such that, instead
339 Id. at 99-100.
340 Id. at 71-72.
341 Id. at 100.
3 4 2 Id. at 102-103.
343 See, e.g., id.; Conk, supra note 112.
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of alleviating human disease, the system may become an instrument in
perpetrating human debilitation.
VI. TORT LITIGATION: A CHISEL TO CRACK THE
TRIANGLE?
Many believe that combating disease or compensating its
victims is a responsibility that should be placed on the medical
profession, because it is in the best position to address technical issues
in science. 344 They believe that it should also be the responsibility of
government agencies, because it is their official function to oversee
prescription drug and vaccine regulations and address sensitive issues
such as scientists' misconduct.
Indeed, the FDA and NIH have policies on conflict of interest.
However, scientists and physicians who work with FDA are granted
waivers because the agency needs their invaluable expertise.
Furthermore, action is slow and most often ineffective because of the
very nature of the medical-science community. Physicians and
scientists who are affiliated with institutions that play in the triangle
(industry, government, and academe) safeguard controversial issues,
like the SV40 controversy within the confines of the community-in
closed-door seminar rooms, in medical-scientific journals and in
meetings away from public scrutiny-in order to maintain public trust
in their professional authority and judgments. 345
Others may believe that industry and the market have the
346intrinsic ability to correct themselves. Yet, the nature of self-
correction in the market takes too long,347 while the risk of vaccine
contamination is a pressing issue. Furthermore, the market may be like
348its human creators-erratic, unsure, and in need of supervision.
Of course, there is power and influence in the media.
Journalists have done research and written compelling stories on the
SV40 controversy for the past twenty years. But media inquiries can be
easily dismissed as lacking credibility and respect among players in the
triangle.
344 Conk, supra note 112, at 1098.
345 See generally, JASANOFF, supra note 211, at 50.
346 See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 183, at 1512, 1521 (arguing that
courts should leave product category decisions to the marketplace).
347 Jim Hoagland, A Tsunami of Scandal -- Clean up America's Exposed System,





The world is accustomed to thinking of the law as an
instrument of justice, but not as an instrument of health. We
expect epidemics to be defeated in the clinic or in the
community, not in the courtroom. Yet the power of the law
... is now undeniable. Used with discipline, the law can
awaken public outrage, strengthen public policies and
redress injuries-results that advance both justice and
health.3 4
9
To most health experts, the idea of litigation as an instrument
of public health is not only mysterious, but also distinctly
uncomfortable. 350  By training, they expect health problems to be
solved in a research laboratory or in a clinical setting-not in a
courtroom. 351 Legal terminology, adversarial proceedings, and
complicated appeals are foreign to their experience.
Today, however, the power of litigation has become an
indispensable instrument of public health, which is demonstrated by the
example of tobacco litigation.
B. The Tobacco Litigation Experience: An Example of
the Power of Litigation as a Tool to Advance Public Health
Tobacco litigation began with a personal injury lawsuit in353
America in 1954 . For more than forty years, the tobacco industry
boasted that it had not lost a single case.354 However, this all changed
in 1994 when litigation in one case in Minnesota 355 ruled that tobacco
industry internal documents be put into the public domain.
356
349 DOUGLAS BLANKE, WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOWARDS HEALTH WITH
JUSTICE: LITIGATION AND PUBLIC INQUIRIES AS TOOLS FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 67
(2002), available at http://www.who.int/to bacco/media/en/finaljordan-report.pdf.35 0Id. at 14.
351 id.
352 id.
3 3 Id. at 16.
354 BLANKE, supra note 349, at 17.
355 State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 606 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000). See also e.g., Roberta B. Walburn, The Role of the Once Confidential Industry
Documents, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 431 (1999); Michael V. Ciresi, Roberta B.
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1. Confidential Documents Discovered During Litigation
Revealed
Fraudulence in the Industry
The Minnesota case was settled on terms favorable to plaintiffs
in 1998357. The most significant result was not the enormous financial
settlement, but the disclosure of millions of pages of once-secret
internal documents of the tobacco industry. Documents dating back to
the mid-1950s proved beyond doubt that the industry had known for
decades that tobacco causes addiction and death. Further, the industry
manipulated it to make it more addictive, and expanded into new
markets by getting more teenagers and women to smoke, which
increased company profits, and covering up all of this information. 358
Walbum and Tara Sutton, Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota
Tobabacco Litigation, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 477 (1999).
356 BLANKE, supra note 349, at 44-46. The tobacco industry documents are available
in warehouses in Minnesota, USA, Guildford, England and at the Brown &
Williamson Collection at the University of California in San Francisco. See Tobacco
Control Archives, http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco (last visited Dec 16, 2007); see
also Centers for Disease Control - Tobacco Industry Documents Web Sites,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/industrydocs/docsites.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007);
Tobacco.org, http://www.tobacco.org (last visited Jan. 31, 2007); Tobacco Control
Supersite, http://www.health.usyd.edu.au/tobacco (last visited Feb. 3, 2007); Tobacco
Documents Online, http://www.tobaccodocuments.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2007);
http://www.house.gov/commerce/ TobaccoDocs/documents.htmi; Smokefree.net,
http://www.smokefree.net (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) "These documents come from
the files of those manufacturers who sell most of the cigarettes sold in the United
States: Philip Morris, BAT Group and its U.S. subsidiary, Brown & Williamson;
Lorilard and Liggett & Myers. Because these documents were produced in the course
of the Minnesota case, they include only a fraction of the documents in those
companies' files worldwide. For example, the documents do not include all company
files with regard to second-hand smoke." BLANKE, supra note 349, at 46.
357 See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Consent Judgment, State ex
rel. Humphrey, supra note 355. See also Henry Weinstein, Big Tobacco Settles
Minnesota Lawsuit for $6.6 Billion, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1998, at Al (reporting that
the settlement was unprecedented in terms of monetary relief, injunctive
requirements, and disclosure of internal tobacco company documents).
358 BLANKE supra note 349, at 24. See also Yussuf Saloojee & Elif Dagli, Tobacco
Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health, 7 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 902, 910 (2000); Richard D. Hurt & Charming R. Robertson, Prying
Open the Door to the Tobacco Industry's Secrets About Nicotine: The Minnesota
Tobacco Trial; 280 JAMA 1173, 1174, 1176 (1998); Judith Mackay, Lessons from
Private Statements of the Tobacco Industry, Commentary, 78 BULLETIN OF THE
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 911, 912 (2000).
[Vol. 11. 2:125
THE POLIO VACCINE
Further examination of the tobacco industry's public and private
statements on the issue of nicotine addiction evoked a sense of outrage.
On April 14, 1994, seven CEOs of America's seven biggest tobacco
companies took an oath to tell the truth to a committee of the US House
of Representatives.3 5 9 They were asked whether they believed nicotine
was addictive. They all said no. However, internal documents
revealed that the industry knew that nicotine was an addictive
substance and cigarettes are the ultimate delivery device. Industry
knew that nicotine addiction may even be enhanced through cigarette
design manipulations. Addison Yeaman, General Counsel of Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, in a memo stated, "...Nicotine is
addictive. We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive
drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms.' 36
0
The documents also describe how the tobacco industry singled
out scientists whom they believed could be persuaded to work with,
and for, them. They collaborated with some of the most respected
scientific institutions and scientists who argued against studies
regarding the damaging effects of tobacco. 361
In an article in the Bulletin of the World Health Organization,
Judith Mackay, Senior Policy Adviser of the Tobacco Free Initiative
(TFI)362 of the World Health Organization said:
They would then pay them well to criticize the scientific
methods used by others, to dispute findings of studies
performed on secondhand tobacco smoke, to concoct
contrary articles and appear as 'expert witnesses' for their
side against clean indoor air measures at government
hearings.363
359 Todd Lewan, Dark Secrets of Tobacco Company Exposed, 7 TOBACCO
CONTROL, 315 (1998), available at http://tc.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/7/3/315.
360 Addison Yeaman, BAT Speaks Out on Nicotine, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE,
(September 1998), available at
http://www.bmjpg.com/data/tobarch/autumn98/indwatch.htm.
361 Mackay, supra note 358, at 911-12.
362 The Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) is a Cabinet level project created by the
WHO Director General to coordinate a more strategic and aggressive response to the
global problem of tobacco use. TFI seeks to increase awareness of the issue, mobilize
resources and foster new partnerships - all to stimulate adoption of more effective
policies at the national, regional and global levels. See TFI
http://tobacco.who.int/repository/stp58/whoinquiry.pdf
363 Mackay, supra note 353, at 911; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS: TOBACCO
COMPANY STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL ACTIVITIES AT THE
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Internal documents also revealed that government employees
who resisted tobacco control efforts have been shown to have acted in
liaison with the tobacco industry.3 6
4
2. Internal Documents Showed Manipulation of Public Health
Efforts
Furthermore, the documents contained a surprising amount of
information about industry manipulation of public health efforts in
particular regions, and how the industry would use front groups,
365
"independent" consultants and secret political allies. For example, a
stunning fifteen-page memorandum was discovered in the Minnesota
documents which revealed the strategy used by the tobacco industry in
1993 to defeat a ban on tobacco advertising proposed by Dr. Sherif
Omar, a member of the Egyptian parliament.366
It was discovered that the plan was developed by the regional
offices of multi-national Philip Morris Corporation, even though Philip
Morris' share of the Egyptian market was minimal. 367 The plan
outlined strategies for legislative maneuvering and mobilization of
public opposition to the legislation, the secret use of allies and
intermediaries. It suggested that these secret surrogates included
prominent political figures in Egypt and neighboring countries.
3. The Effect of Tobacco Litigation on Medical Practice:
Physicians Now Verified that Smoking Causes Cancer
Until then, physicians only knew that smoking was associated
with cancer. Today, the medical profession identifies cigarette
smoking as the single most predominant cause of lung cancer. 368
Physicians now warn their patients with confidence that indeed-
smoking causes cancer.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2000), available at
http://tobacco.who.int/repository/stp58/whojinquiry.pdf.
364 Mackay, supra note 358, at 911.
365 BLANKE, supra note 349, at 44-45.
3 66 Id. at 45.
367 Id. at 46.
368 Id. at 16-17. See also e.g., Anthony Alberg, Malcolm Brock & Jonathan Samet,




4. Global Policies on Tobacco Control Emerge
The Minnesota trial and the discovery of the truth about
tobacco industry practices have ignited appropriate legislative and
public health policy response. On October 20, 1998, the World Health
Organization officially launched the global Tobacco Free Initiative
(TFI), a project which seeks to increase awareness of the issue,
mobilize resources and foster new partnerships-all to stimulate
adoption of more effective tobacco control policies at the national,
regional and global levels.
In a speech, Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General of
the WHO said, "There is every reason to believe that through these
documents we will find information that will add power to the ability of
countries all over the world to press for comprehensive tobacco control
measures."
369
In May 2003, 191 WHO Member States convened at the 56th
World Health Assembly to adopt the world's first public health treaty,
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC).
This groundbreaking treaty is the first legal instrument designed to
reduce tobacco-related deaths and disease around the world. The text
for WHO FCTC covers tobacco taxation, smoking prevention and
treatment, illicit trade, advertising, sponsorship and promotion, and
product regulation.
370
Last February 2005, the WHO FCTC entered into full force as
provisions of the Treaty was made legally binding for the first forty
countries that became Contracting parties before November 30,
2004.371 As of today, fifty-seven countries have become party to the
WHO FCTC, which represents 2.3 billion people. Its entry into force is
a demonstration of governments' commitment to reduce death and
illness from tobacco use.
372
369 Gro Harlem Brundtand, Director-General of the World Health Org., Speech at
Media Advocacy Workshop, Tobacco Free Initiative, World Health Org. (Oct. 20,
1998), available at http:/www.who.int/entity/tobacco/media/en/InquirySwiss.pdf.
370 Press Release, World Health Organization, An International Treaty for Tobacco
Control (Aug. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.who.int/features/2003/08/en/print.html.
371 Press Release, World Health Organization, Global Tobacco Treaty Enters into
Force with 57 Countries Already Committed: Parties Represent 2.3 Billion People
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Country parties to the WHO FCTC are supposed to translate its
general provisions into national laws and regulations. For example,
these countries will have three years from the day it enters into force, to
implement measures to ensure that tobacco packaging has strong health
warnings, or five years to establish comprehensive tobacco advertising,
promotion and sponsorship bans, among others.
373
C. The Bottom Line
Often, reports of billion dollar settlements may have a
mesmerizing effect on people, impairing sober understanding of the
true risk and expense of litigation. 374 However, successful cases, as
illustrated above, show that litigation can provide solutions. While
litigation is not a good way to produce great science, it can steer
science to honest and ethical means in order to benefit people.
375
Tort litigation would determine whether the manufacturer knew
or should have known of a warning inadequacy and petitioned the FDA
for a change in the labeling to solve the inadequacy. 376 Should tort
litigation show that the manufacturer has petitioned the FDA for a
change in labeling and the FDA rejected the petition, clearly, the
manufacturer should not be held liable. 377 Manufacturers are in better
control of scientific research, and tort law will determine if
contamination is verifiably, a risk that is within the manufacturer's
control. Judges and juries can assess conflicting evidence of whether
modern molecular techniques of decontamination were doable at the
time of sale and would have attained FDA approval as safe and
effective. Furthermore, tort litigation can make a determination of
manufacturer compliance with FDA regulatory standards and uncovering
unethical business practices.
Tort litigation will speed definitive action from authorities who
can impact change for society, which is shown by the Tobacco
Litigation experience.
For the purposes of this paper, the goal of tort litigation should not be the
removal of a drug or vaccine from the market because science may discover
373 Id.
374 BLANKE, supra note 349, at 60.
375 JASANOFF, supra note 214, at 50. (The adversary process exposes the
conflicts of scientific knowledge; research can take off and is undertaken more
vigorously after the onset of litigation).
376 Daniel Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability & Product
Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1853, 1898-99 (1995).
37 7 Id. at 1899.
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new ways to use old risky drugs like Thalidomide. The critical goal of tort
litigation then should be to guard against negligence-to guarantee that only
the safest and highest quality of vaccines is made available in the market.
The difficulty in tort litigation however, is that judges and juries
will have to deal with overwhelming amounts of information and they
will be confronted with complicated medical-scientific theories. A
debate among scientists at the frontiers of research will await them,
from topics that range from modem molecular techniques, to viral
inactivation methods. They must weigh scientific evidence against
their knowledge of human nature regarding motivations that govern
human action and then render verdict accordingly. 378
A jury comprised of exceptionally strong, hard-working, discerning
and honest individuals is therefore crucial to arrive at the truth.
VII. CONCLUSION
[C]learly, a person subjected to the risk of latent harm has had
his life changed permanently. Clearly also, we do not want injurers to
escape the costs of their actions merely because those costs do not
become completely manifest over a period of time.379
Billions of doses of polio vaccines have already been
administered worldwide in the last thirty-five years. At the time of this
writing, the authors are not aware of the specific course of action
undertaken by government health agencies in response to Shah's
admission of using Proteinase K, a crude method of detecting the
presence of SV40 in human tumors, when more reliable and advanced
scientific methods have already been recognized by the science
community.
There are many unanswered questions. But it is beyond the
scope of this paper to lay fault on anyone, or to investigate the detail of
events in the course of SV40's fifty-year history, when more facts are
hidden within the confines of science and medicine. It is more
important to focus on what must be done at present to protect the
people. First and foremost, is to guarantee-using the most modern
scientific techniques-that all vaccines are "clean" from contaminated
matter such as SV40. Second, is to develop state of the art molecular
378 See Brewer, supra note 205, at 1535, 1666; see also Michael Owen Miller &
Thomas A. Mauet, The Psychology of Jury Persuasion, 549 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
549-570 (1999).
379 Note, Latent Harms and Risk-based Damages, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1505,
1522 (1998).
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assays, with an excellent, appropriate degree of sensitivity and
specificity, in order to screen for SV40 in the human body. Third and
most importantly, is to develop a therapeutic strategy or antidote for
those who may have been infected with the virus SV40 in order to
prevent possible full-blown carcinogenic effects in the future. Such
efforts must start now, before the controversy reaches public alarm.
Still, one must understand the depth of public fear when an
issue of contaminated vaccines reaches their understanding. Vaccines
are supposed to protect one from disease and finding out that they are a
source of sickness will have grave consequences on the confidence not
just in the stability of the medical profession but also on the FDA and
the American government it represents.
Reason dictates that the legal profession should leave this
controversy to the medical-scientific profession or to the FDA.
However, in a system of triangulation, when manufacturers face
possible questions of negligence, which have disastrous effects on
people, when the public is uncertain of government protection over
their health, potentially relying on scientists who are involved in
scientific misconduct-then such issues may only be resolved with the
help of tort litigation. Used with proper discipline, the law can become
an indispensable instrument of public health.
Yes, the authors are painting an overly-idealistic picture of how
things ought to be. But significant change can only occur with a vision
of principles that supersedes what lies before the eyes.
When all is said and done in medicine-science, in industry and
in government-with regard to the SV40 controversy and the lives of
the people at stake-then the power to revolutionize and initiate
movement towards the truth, now depends on the wisdom of the
lawyer. And whether the Restatement (Third) will be used to
illuminate the truth or further cloud it, remains to be seen.
For the meantime-perhaps the real controversial spectacle-
will be the battle in the courtroom.
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